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1. Introduction 
The European corporate bond market has grown substantially during the past decades. 
Van Landschoot (2004) reports that the number and market value of Euro-denominated 
corporate bonds more than doubled during the years between 1993 and 2003, with especially 
the A and BBB rated segment growing substantially to account for nearly half of individual 
bond issues outstanding at the time of writing. In recent years, the increasing regulation in the 
banking industry has been pushing Europe towards even more vivid capital markets and away 
from the traditional reliance on bank financing. With Basel III Accord and Solvency II to be 
implemented in the near future, bank financing can be expected to become more expensive as 
well as its terms and conditions more restrictive, causing corporates to seek an increasingly 
large portion of their debt financing through the capital markets
1
. Further, a growing number 
of mid-cap companies often without an official credit rating by one of the major credit rating 
agencies are extending their funding sources towards the bond markets, while traditionally 
bonds have mostly been issued by large rated companies.  
As a result of the increasing activity in the European bond markets, the understanding of 
credit risk has become essential. Numerous research papers have addressed questions 
regarding credit risk measurement (see Altman and Saunders, 1998, for a comprehensive 
review on the developments of credit risk measurement) as well as specific credit spread 
determinants (e.g. Elton et al., 2001; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). The credit rating industry 
naturally also plays an important role in this part of the capital markets, and has thus also been 
subject to vast economic research. A number of papers have studied, for example, the role, 
information value and security pricing effects of credit ratings (see, e.g., Hand et al., 1992; 
Liu et al., 1993; Liu and Moore, 1999; and Kliger and Sarig, 2000).  
The amount of bonds and other securities outstanding that do not have official credit 
ratings already make up a sizeable portion of the European capital markets. According to the 
Financial Times, there was USD 58 billion worth of unrated bond sales in 2013, and issuance 
has continued at roughly the same pace in 2014
2
. Generally speaking, unrated bond issues 
have reportedly accounted for around 10 % of the European bond market in recent years. 
Although credit risk has been an extensively studied topic for some time now, this unrated 
                                                          
1
See: Why Basel III And Solvency II Will Hurt Corporate Borrowing In Europe More Than In The 
U.S. A report published by Standard and Poor’s, September 11. 2011 
2
 ”’Dash for trash’ lifts unrated debt sales”, Financial Times, May 19, 2014 
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part of the markets has been somewhat neglected in economic literature discussing credit risk, 
credit ratings and securities pricing. As the European bond markets are constantly growing, 
and the credit risk of unrated securities is arguably not as straightforward for investors to 
assess, it is of interest to study how credit risk is accounted for in the prices of these unrated 
securities. This thesis aims to shed light on whether credit risk is similarly priced in European 
unrated bond issues as it is in rated issues, or if pricing (i.e. credit spread) discrepancies occur. 
Effectively, this paper also addresses the question of what the effects of lacking a credit rating 
are for a company and its bonds.  
In the study, I utilize three models with different theoretical underpinnings to measure the 
credit risk of a sample of unrated bonds. These credit risk measurements are then used to map 
the unrated bonds into implied credit rating classes. The motivation for using three alternate 
models is to find one that is as unbiased in the credit risk estimations as possible. That is, the 
study aims to utilize a credit risk model that is able to map the unrated bonds as correctly as 
possible into the credit rating classes they would belong to if they had official credit ratings. 
Thus, in order to assess the accuracy of the conducted credit risk measurements and credit 
rating mappings, the same calculations are performed for a sample of rated bonds. After 
mapping the unrated bond issues into implied credit rating classes, I assess whether their 
credit spreads are comparatively equal to those of rated bonds with corresponding levels of 
credit risk, i.e. credit ratings, and otherwise similar characteristics. If credit risk is equally 
well accounted for in the prices of both rated and unrated bonds, and other relevant factors 
affecting credit spreads are controlled for, then theoretically the credit spreads of these two 
bond categories should not differ from each other. If, on the other hand, credit risk is not 
priced in an equal manner in unrated and rated bond issues, systematic yield spread 
differences will occur.  
The structure of the study is as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the definition of credit 
risk as well as the determinants of credit spreads to lay a theoretical ground for the study. 
Section 3 introduces credit risk measurement on a general level and discusses the special role 
of credit ratings in the bond markets. In Section 4, the credit risk measurement models used in 
this thesis are presented in more detail. Section 5 provides a description of the data used for 
the study, and in Section 6 the study’s results and their implications are discussed. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2. Credit risk 
The value of a particular issue of corporate debt depends essentially on three factors: 1) 
the required return on riskless debt, 2) the various provisions and restrictions of the bond (e.g. 
maturity, coupons, seniority in the event of default, call terms, sinking funds etc.) and 3) the 
probability that the firm will be unable to satisfy some or all of the bond indenture 
requirements, i.e. the probability of default (Merton, 1974). The third factor, namely the 
probability of default, is often viewed as the main determinant of credit risk. In fact, some 
even define credit risk as default risk alone. Duffie and Singleton (2003), for example, define 
credit risk to be the risk of default or the risk of reductions in market value caused by changes 
in the credit quality of issuers or counterparties. In line with the latter part of the this 
definition, Fabbozzi (2000) suggests that investors are in fact more concerned with the 
changes in perceived default risk, i.e. changes in the yield spreads demanded by investors for 
a given level of default risk, and/or the costs associated with a given level of default risk, than 
with the actual event of default. Fabozzi (2000) specifies the reason for this to be that the 
change in perceived default risk, i.e. in demanded yield spreads, can have an immediate effect 
on the value of the bond, even though the actual default event may be highly unlikely. As the 
spreads investors demand for investing in bond issues are the key ingredient of study when 
examining credit risk as well as the pricing behavior of investors in the bond markets, their 
determinants are elaborated on in more detail below.  
2.1 Credit spreads 
The market value of credit risk is often measured as the yield spread between a credit-
risky instrument and an otherwise identical Treasury (risk-free) security. As this yield spread 
is indeed in large part due to the credit risk of corporate bonds, it is often referred to as the 
credit spread, and can be thought of as the compensation to investors for bearing the risks 
inherent in corporate bond issues. (Sundaresan, 2002) 
Much of the research conducted on corporate bond pricing and credit spreads is based on 
so-called structural or contingent-claim models, initiated by Black & Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1974). Structural models relate default events (credit risk) to the issuing firm’s asset 
value and capital structure in an intuitively simple manner: default occurs if the firm’s asset 
value falls below the firm’s debt value. Thus, structural models also provide a meaningful 
way to assess what affects the price of credit risk, and define corporate yield spreads to be 
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determined by the following factors: the prevailing spot rate and slope of the yield curve, the 
value and volatility of the issuer company’s assets, the possibility of downward jumps, as well 
as the prevalent business climate. These determinants are described in more detail under 
Section 2.2. 
Although the credit spread determinants of structural models are widely acknowledged by 
academics, research has found that various other factors are also likely to explain credit 
spreads (see, e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). For example, bond liquidity, taxes and risk 
premia for systematic risk have also been suggested to account for variations in credit 
spreads. Also these determinants are elaborated on in Section 2.3. 
2.2 Structural determinants of credit spreads 
Structural models commonly identify six key determinants affecting the probability of 
default and thus credit spreads. These determinants are presented below. 
Spot rate 
A negative relation between credit spreads and the spot rate, i.e. the prevailing risk-free 
rate, has been found to persist for corporate bonds (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Van 
Lanschoot, 2004). The logic behind this negative relation is that an increase in the spot rate 
suggests an increase in the expected growth rate of a firm’s asset value. In the structural 
framework, a higher growth rate reduces the probability that the value of a firm’s assets will 
fall below the value of its liabilities, meaning a lower probability of default. A lower default 
probability again implies that investors will demand lower credit spreads for investing in the 
firm’s bonds (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995). Put the other way around, a low spot rate 
implies a low growth rate of assets, which means that there is a higher probability that the 
value of a firm’s assets will fall below the value of its debt. Again, this implies a higher 
probability of default and thus higher credit spreads.  
Furthermore, as Van Landschoot (2004) points out, low interest rates are often associated 
with a weakening economy. A negative outlook for the economy translates into lower risk-
appetite in the capital markets, meaning that higher spreads are demanded to compensate for 
credit risk. Also, studies suggest that the sensitivity to the spot rates varies with bond 
characteristics. For example, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find that the sensitivity to interest 
rates is higher for lower rated bonds, which means that high-risk bonds react to changes in the 
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spot rate more aggressively than low-risk bonds. In addition, Van Landschoot (2004) reports 
that the significance of the spot rate as a credit spread determinant depends on the maturity of 
the bond, first increasing and then slightly decreasing with maturity. 
Slope of the yield curve 
As, for example, Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) report, most variations in the term 
structure of interest rates, i.e. the yield curve, are driven by the level and slope of the yield 
curve. If an increase in the slope of the yield curve implies an increase in the expected short 
rate, then the same argument as in the section above advocates a decrease in credit spreads. 
That is, a higher short rate implies a higher asset growth rate, which translates to lower default 
risk and lower credit spreads. Furthermore, the slope of the yield curve is often linked to 
future business cycle conditions. An increase in the slope is then considered to be an 
indication of a strengthening economy, implying lower default rates and lower credit spreads 
(Van Lanschoot, 2004).  
Mixed results on the significance of the slope of the yield curve as a credit spread 
determinant are reported. Van Landschoot (2004) studies the European bond market, and 
reports the slope of the yield curve to be an important determinant of credit spreads. Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) study the US bond market and gather contradictory findings, reporting 
that the slope of the term structure is not of large significance when determining credit 
spreads. 
Asset value / Leverage 
As previously mentioned, in the framework of structural models, default is triggered if a 
firm’s asset value falls below the value of its debt. This means that firms with asset values 
high above debt values, in other words firms with low leverage ratios, are less likely to 
default. Lower leverage ratios thus imply lower credit spreads, which is quite intuitive. 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) report that leverage is a significant factor in determining credit 
spreads, and that the sensitivity of credit spreads to changes in the leverage ratio tends to 
increase with leverage. That is, the higher the value of debt with regard to the value of assets, 
the more sensitive credit spreads are to changes in leverage. Furthermore, Van Landschoot 
(2004) reports that changes in asset value have a stronger effect on bonds with a short term to 
maturity. The credit spreads of bonds with less time to repayment are thus more sensitive to 
changes in the leverage ratio. 
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Asset volatility & downward jump 
In the structural framework, equity is viewed as a call option on a firm’s assets with a 
strike price equal to the value of its debt. The logic here is that due to the limited liability 
feature of equity, equity holders have the right, but not the obligation, to pay off the firm’s 
debt holders and take over the remaining assets of the firm
3
. This means that if the value of 
the firm’s assets is less than the value of its debt, i.e. the strike price, the call option will not 
be exercised and default will occur. With put-call parity, debt claims can then be viewed as 
containing a short position on a put option on the firm’s assets. As option value increases with 
volatility, it follows that credit spreads should increase with volatility (Collin-Dufresne et al., 
2001). This relationship is quite intuitive. As Van Landschoot (2004) points out, higher asset 
volatility corresponds to a higher likelihood that a firm’s asset value will fall below the value 
of its debt, i.e. that the firm will default with a higher likelihood. Again, this translates to 
higher credit spreads. Both Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Van Landschoot (2004) find that 
the effect of volatility is significant in determining credit spreads, but clearly asymmetric: 
increases in implied volatility strongly affect credit spreads, whereas decreases do not.  
Following the logic of asset volatility indicating higher credit spreads, increases in either 
the probability or the magnitude of a downward jump in asset value should also increase 
credit spreads. This is supported by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), who report that an increase 
in the markets’ expected probability of a downward jump triggers an increase in credit 
spreads homogenously across bond groups. 
Business climate 
Many structural models consider the so-called recovery rate to be a partial explanation as 
to why credit spreads exist. The recovery rate can be defined as the portion of promised 
payments the bondholder receives in the event of default (see, e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 
2001). Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that even if a firm’s probability of default 
remains constant, changes in credit spreads can occur due to changes in the expected recovery 
rate, which in turn should be a function of the overall business climate. When the business 
climate is good, recovery rates should be comparatively better and credit spreads smaller. 
This relation is confirmed to prevail by the results of their study. 
                                                          
3
 The framework of structural models is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. 
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2.3 Other determinants of credit spreads 
Although structural models are widely used in credit spread estimations, it has been 
recognized that the credit risk determinants of structural models only explain a part of the 
observed credit spreads. For example, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find that the traditional 
factors of structural models presented under Section 2.2 only explain about 25 % of the 
variation in credit spreads. Also Elton et al. (2001) conclude that default risk accounts for no 
more than 25 % of credit spreads. The remaining fraction of credit spreads has been suggested 
to be the result of factors related to liquidity, taxes and systematic risk. These factors are 
introduced in more detail below. 
Liquidity 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that investors aim at maximizing expected returns 
net of transaction or liquidity costs, with the bid-ask spread being a natural measure of these 
costs. High liquidity implies that bonds are traded frequently and easily, which implies lower 
bid-ask spreads. Low liquidity, on the other hand, implies that the bond is not as easily 
tradable, resulting in higher bid-ask spreads. Also Van Landschoot (2004) suggests that 
investors are only willing to invest in less liquid assets compared to similar liquid assets at a 
higher premium. Van Landschoot (2004) argues that, as government bond markets are larger 
and more liquid than corporate bond markets, investors may expect some compensation for 
the lower liquidity when investing in corporate bonds.  
Chen et al. (2007) use three alternate proxy measures for liquidity risk and find a 
significant association between liquidity and bond yield spreads. The authors conclude that 
liquidity alone can explain as much as 7 % of the cross-sectional variation in bond yields for 
investment grade bonds, and as much as 22 % for speculative grade bonds. Also Van 
Lanschoot (2004) reports the level of liquidity, measured as the bid-ask spread, to be a 
significant determinant of credit spread changes on bonds of all rating categories considered 
in the study.  
Taxes 
Elton et al. (2001) suggest differences between corporate and government bond taxation 
to be one of the main reasons for why the demanded spreads for these two bond classes differ. 
Elton et al. (2001) claim that, as corporate bonds are subject to state and local taxes on 
interest payments in the US, whereas government bonds are not, corporate bonds have to offer 
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a higher pre-tax return to yield the same after-tax return. The results of the study indicate that 
taxes account for an even larger portion of the spreads between corporate and treasury bonds 
than do expected default losses. Of course, these results do not directly imply taxes to be a 
determinant of credit spreads in the European bond market. Furthermore, taxes most likely 
cannot explain possible differences in the credit spreads of different corporate bonds. 
Systematic risk 
Elton et al. (2001) advocate that if corporate bond returns vary systematically with other 
assets in the market, whereas government bonds, which are often perceived risk-free, do not, 
then corporate bonds should carry a risk premium to compensate for the non-diversifiable 
risk, just like any other asset. The study concludes that as much as 85 % of credit spreads not 
accounted for by taxes and expected default losses can be explained by systematic risk 
premia. Elton et al. (2001) state this risk premium to be affected by the same influences that 
affect systematic risks in the stock market. 
3. Measuring credit risk 
Credit risk measurement has been a popular topic of research for decades, and a large 
variety of measurement methods and models have been developed. This section introduces 
three key classes of credit risk measurement prevalent in academic literature: 1) accounting 
based credit scoring models, 2) structural credit risk models and 3) reduced form models. 
After these introductions, the special role of credit ratings in credit risk measurement is 
discussed by elaborating on the information value of credit ratings and the effect that credit 
ratings have been suggested to have on the pricing of corporate bonds. The credit risk 
measurement models utilized in this study, i.e. the shadow rating model, the Altman’s Z-
Score model and the Merton DD-model, are discussed in more detail in Section 4.  
3.1 General classes for credit risk measurement 
Measuring a company’s default risk is a central problem of credit risk analysis, and 
various approaches to modeling default probabilities have been pursued. One of the main 
classes of credit risk measurement are so-called multivariate accounting based credit scoring 
models, in which key accounting variables are combined and weighted to produce either a 
credit risk score or a probability of default (Altman and Saunders, 1998). Altman and 
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Saunders (1998) list four methodological approaches to developing multivariate credit-
scoring models: 1) the linear probability model, 2) the logit model, 3) the probit model and 4) 
the discriminant analysis model. According to the abovementioned authors, the by far most 
commonly used approach is the fourth one, which uses discriminant analysis as a statistical 
technique. Discriminant analysis models seek to find a linear function of accounting (and 
sometimes market) variables that best distinguishes between two classes: default and no 
default. The pioneering and arguably most recognized model of this kind is the Altman‘s Z-
Score, which is also used for credit risk measurement in this thesis, and is thus elaborated on 
more closely in Section 4.  
While multivariate accounting based credit-scoring models have been shown to perform 
quite well in assessing the probability of default, they have been subject to at least three key 
kinds of criticism. First, book value accounting data fails to pick up more subtle and fast-
moving factors affecting bond issuers and their credit risk. These kinds of factors are much 
more efficiently picked up by market variables. Thus, the prediction power and accuracy of 
book value based credit risk models is limited by definition. The second set of criticism 
relates to the fact that multivariate accounting based models are often based on an assumption 
of linearity. The real world is, however, by no means linear. Thus, multivariate accounting 
based models are not able to forecast default as accurately as models that relax the linearity 
assumption among explanatory variables. The third set of criticism often targeted at these 
models is that they are often only tenuously linked to any theoretical underpinnings, for 
example when choosing which variables to include in the model. This has in part led to the 
development of other more theory based approaches to estimating the probability of default. 
(Altman and Saunders, 1998) 
One class of default prediction models with stronger theoretical underpinnings are so-
called structural models, introduced partly already under Section 2.1. In structural models, an 
issuer’s inability to pay is explicitly modeled as the default-triggering event, which means that 
it can be predicted. Structural models are often also referred to as market based models, as 
they incorporate market based variables, such as the market value of equity and the market 
value of leverage, into the default estimations. One key model belonging to this category is 
the classic structural model of Merton (1974), in which default occurs at the maturity date of 
debt in the event that the value of the issuer’s assets is less than the face value of its debt 
(Duffie and Singleton, 2003). In this model, equity is viewed as a call option on the issuer’s 
assets, which links the prediction of default to the option pricing theory of Black and Scholes 
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(1973). The classic Merton model has been extended in a number of ways.
4
 One innovative 
and widely acknowledged model used by both academics and practitioners is the Moody’s 
KMV model (also known as the Vasicek-Kealhofer / VK model or the Expected-Default-
Frequency / EDF model). The Moody’s KMV model was originally developed by the KMV 
Corporation, which was later on acquired by Moody’s (see, e.g., Bharath and Shumway, 
2008). The Moody’s KMV model builds on insights collected from modifications to the 
classical Merton model applied by various research papers. Also, the model uses an 
empirically constructed distribution of distance-to-default, i.e. the number of standard 
deviations the firm is away from default, to generate an Expected Default Frequency credit 
risk measure, instead of using the normal distribution (Arora et al., 2005). The distance-to-
default distribution is only in Moody’s proprietary use, which means that practitioners often 
use a simpler variant of the Moody’s KMV model in default estimations. A variant of the 
model is also used in this thesis, and will thus be discussed in more detail under Section 4.  
A third broad category of default prediction models are so called reduced-form models. In 
contrast to structural models, the reduced-form approach does not attempt to model the asset 
value and capital structure of the issuer. Instead, reduced-form models treat default as an 
unexpected event, the likelihood of which depends on a default intensity (or hazard rate) 
process (Duffie and Singleton, 2003; Van Landschoot, 2004). Mathematically, these models 
are more adaptable, which means that they are more suitable for, for example, credit 
derivatives pricing (Van Landschoot, 2004).
5
 However, Arora et al. (2005) comment that this 
flexibility may result in reduced-form models with strong in-sample fitting properties, but 
poor out-of-sample predictive ability. Furthermore, reduced-form models represent a 
characterization of default risk that is generally less grounded in the economics driving 
default, and more in mathematical tractability, which makes it more challenging to diagnose 
how model performance could be improved (Arora et al., 2005). As reduced-form models are 
mathematically quite complex and often intuitively less informative, the models were not 
considered suitable for the purposes of this thesis. 
                                                          
4 See Arora et al. (2005) for a brief summary of these various extensions. 
5 See Arora et al. (2005) for a more thorough comparison of reduced form and structural models. 
 
11 
 
3.2 Credit ratings 
As Fabozzi (2001) points out, few individual investors and institutional bond investors 
rely solely on their own credit analysis to estimate the ability of bond issuers living up to their 
future contractual obligations. Instead, investors utilize public credit ratings produced by 
commercial rating companies, such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, to assess a 
bond’s attractiveness. Standard & Poor’s (2012) define an issue credit rating to be “a forward-
looking opinion about the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a specific financial 
obligation, a specific class of financial obligations, or a specific financial program”, and 
emphasize the likelihood of default, encompassing both the capacity and willingness to pay, 
to be the single most important factor in their assessment of the creditworthiness of an issuer 
or an obligation. Although credit ratings are in fact just opinions issued by commercial 
companies, investors often rely on them to incorporate practically all relevant information on 
a bond issuer’s or issue’s risk profile, and thus perceive credit ratings to be comprehensive 
measures of credit risk. Virtually all public corporate bond issues in the U.S. have been 
assigned a credit rating by at least one of the major credit rating agencies, which highlights 
the credit rating industry’s importance in the financial markets. Additionally, many 
institutional investors have placed restrictions on ratings classes in which they are allowed to 
invest in, as well as on the size of their allocations in each ratings class. This feature of 
pegging investment decisions to official credit ratings adds to the important role credit ratings 
have in today’s capital markets, and will be discussed in more detail in the chapters below.  
Numerous papers in economic literature have studied the value credit ratings incorporate 
and provide to investors in the capital markets. A common question under dispute is whether 
credit ratings encompass incremental information with regard to public bond issuer 
information available from other sources, and whether they thus can independently affect 
security prices or not. Research reports somewhat mixed results. Amongst others, Katz 
(1974), Hand et al. (1992) and Ingram et al. (1983) study the effects credit rating changes 
have on securities prices, and find significant price adjustments following ratings change 
announcements. This supports the argument of credit ratings having an independent effect on 
investors’ pricing behavior. Weinstein (1977), on the other hand, has the same idea of study, 
and finds no evidence of price reactions as a result of announcements on rating changes, 
providing contradictory support. Ederington et al. (1987) examine whether bond yields are 
related to rating information and conclude, not surprisingly, that they are. However, the 
authors also find that market yields vary with ratings independently of the financial 
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accounting variables considered in the study, and conclude that ratings must thus incorporate 
non-public, price-sensitive information. Additionally, studying the price effects of Moody’s 
rating refinement (in which the number modifiers 1, 2 and 3 were added to the original rating 
symbols Aaa, Aa…D), Kliger and Sarig (2000) as well as Liu et al. (1999) find that bond 
prices adjust to the implications provided by the new modifiers. The rating refinement studies 
arguably enable an even better measurement of the informational content of ratings than the 
other aforementioned studies, as the actual credit quality of the companies remained 
completely unchanged during the refinement announcement. This makes the results of the 
studies increasingly plausible, and leads the aforementioned authors to conclude that credit 
ratings must incorporate incremental pricing relevant information. Furthermore, Kliger and 
Sarig (2000) argue that the reason that companies are willing to pay for official credit ratings 
is that they are able to incorporate valuable inside information into the ratings without fully 
disclosing any underlying details to the public.  
Boot et al. (2006), on the other hand, argue that credit ratings derive their value primarily 
from two institutional features: the monitoring role of credit rating agencies, depicted in 
principle by their credit watch procedures, and the role credit ratings play in the investment 
decisions of institutional investors. Regarding the first feature, if market and/or company 
developments threaten to deteriorate the credit rating of a company, the credit rating agency 
takes action and puts the company on credit watch. In the credit watch procedure, the credit 
rating agency enters an implicit contract with the rated company, in which the company 
promises to undertake specific actions to mitigate the possible deterioration of its credit 
rating. The procedure thus adds value to investors, as credit rating agencies act as outside 
overseers of a company’s performance, and give it concrete incentives to prevent its credit 
quality from sinking.  
The second value adding institutional feature of Boot et al. (2006) relates to the fact that 
many institutional investors often stipulate that investments are only allowed in issues with an 
investment grade rating, which effectively conditions investors’ investment decisions on the 
assigned ratings. The authors show that if a sizeable proportion of institutional investors (such 
as pension funds) base investment decisions on credit ratings, other investors will rationally 
follow. As a result, the authors argue that credit ratings serve as problem solvers for situations 
where multiple equilibria situations regarding required rates of return could arise. If investors 
anticipate a high-risk investment, they will demand a high premium, and vice versa if they 
anticipate a low-risk investment. When confronted with a high funding cost, a company is 
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induced to choose a high-risk project as opposed to a low-risk one, as it is forced to pay the 
higher cost in either case. As the authors suggest, however, if the majority of investors 
rationally follow the sizeable proportion of institutional investors using credit ratings to 
determine required returns, these multiple equilibria situations will not arise. Investors will 
perceive the firm’s investment to be as risky as its assigned rating implies. The study by Boot 
et al. (2006) thus implies that for unrated bond issues, it is more likely that multiple equilibria 
situations will arise, which could cause larger variations in demanded rates of return, i.e. 
credit spreads. 
The conditioning of investment decisions on assigned ratings discussed in Boot et al. 
(2006) relates closely to what is known as credit rating migration risk. Changes in credit 
ratings may lead to certain bonds no longer being acceptable in the bond portfolios of 
investors subject to rating restrictions, such as those of many institutional investors, and may 
thus even lead to mandatory termination of financial contracts. Changes in credit ratings can 
also have an effect on many other factors, such as the coupons of so called step-up bonds, 
where coupons are dependent on explicit ratings, as well as rating based regulatory capital for 
banks and credit derivatives, which sometimes have provisions for contingent payments based 
on credit ratings. As a result, specific models for measuring the credit rating migration risk 
have been developed. (Duffie and Singleton, 2003) Also rating agencies themselves produce 
information about the probabilities of a firm migrating from one rating category to another 
(Sundaresan, 2002).  
The factors discussed above demonstrate how widely credit ratings are used in the capital 
markets, and how they can thus affect the demand and prices of securities. This makes 
studying the unrated bond market increasingly interesting. If credit ratings in fact have an 
independent effect on the prices of bonds, and/or if credit ratings are able to provide value 
through the monitoring role of credit rating agencies and the investment decisions of 
institutional investors, it is intuitive to expect the pricing of unrated bond issues to differ from 
that of rated bonds. What makes this pricing discrepancy even more likely is the fact that 
unrated bond issues often automatically fall into the speculative grade category, even if their 
credit quality would actually be of investment grade. If an unrated bond with good credit 
quality, for example an implied rating level Aa, automatically falls into the speculative grade 
category, one could expect its bond’s credit spread to be higher than what would be advocated 
by its actual credit risk. This again raises the question of why a company would rather choose 
to be unrated rather than acquire an official rating, if being unrated negatively affects the 
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value of its bonds. Reuters reports Fitch Ratings to have stated in a special report that credit 
quality is unlikely to be the key driver for the lack of assigned ratings, i.e. the reason for 
choosing to remain unrated is not that the company would be assigned a low quality rating if 
they acquired one. This is for example depicted by the choices of strong unrated issuers; 
among the largest unrated companies are prominent names such as Neste Oil, Finnair and 
SAP AG
6
. Rather, it has been suggested that the companies that choose to issue unrated bonds 
tend to be ones that do not issue bonds that often and, therefore, do not want to go through the 
workload and costs of getting and maintaining a credit rating for infrequent borrowing.
7
 That 
is, companies assess the costs of acquiring credit ratings to overweigh the benefits provided 
by them. 
4. Credit risk measurement models 
This thesis studies the role of credit risk in the pricing of European bonds without official 
credit ratings. In the study, possible credit spread discrepancies between rated and unrated 
bonds with similar credit risk levels and other characteristics are measured. The idea behind 
the study is that if credit risk is equally well accounted for in the prices of both unrated and 
rated bond issues, and possessing a credit rating does not in itself affect the credit spreads of 
bonds, then no significant credit spread differences should occur. Of course, this assumption 
is made given that other relevant factors affecting the level of credit spreads, like the business 
climate around the time of issuance, are also accounted for. In order to be able to compare the 
credit spreads of these unrated and rated bonds with similar credit risk profiles, a method for 
measuring the credit risk of unrated bonds and mapping them to implied rating classes is 
needed. As discussed in Section 3 above, numerous methods for credit risk measurement have 
been developed, which differ both in the explanatory variables included in the model and the 
mathematical / statistical methods used in the calculations. In order to make the results of this 
thesis more viable as well as informative, three different models with somewhat different 
theoretical underpinnings are tested. The goal with estimating credit risk with three alternate 
models is to find a model that is able to map the bond into its implied rating category in a way 
that is as unbiased as possible. That is, the aim is to map the unrated bonds into the rating 
classes that they would actually belong to if they had official ratings. To examine the 
unbiasedness of the models, the credit risk calculations are also performed for a sample of 
                                                          
6
 “RPT-Fitch: Unrated corporate bond issuance in EMEA”, www.reuters.com, Jul 31, 2013. 
7
 ”’Dash for trash’ lifts unrated debt sales”, Financial Times, May 19, 2014 
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bonds that have official credit ratings. For these bonds, the implied ratings and official ratings 
are then compared and the accuracy of the estimations is assessed.  
The three models chosen for the study are presented below. The first of the models 
provides a credit risk estimate, i.e. an implied credit rating, which is directly comparable to 
official credit ratings. The other two models produce default probability estimates, which are 
converted into implied credit ratings using a historical cumulative default rate distribution 
provided by Moody’s. Details on the default distribution can be found in Appendix 2. 
4.1 Shadow credit ratings 
The value and implications of credit ratings discussed in Section 3.2 highlight how widely 
credit ratings affect today’s capital markets. They also bring about the question of what the 
effects of lacking a credit rating are for companies and their individual bond issues. If credit 
ratings in fact affect securities pricing, then it simply follows that securities lacking a credit 
rating should be priced differently, all else equal. This is one of the prime motivations behind 
this thesis, and explains why shadow, or reference, credit ratings were chosen as one of the 
three models for measuring credit risk.  
Shadow credit ratings aim at measuring credit risk in a very similar manner to how credit 
rating agencies themselves do with official credit ratings. As simple measures credit risk, 
proprietary shadow ratings are also applied widely in practice. For example, on the sales side, 
investment banks often produce shadow credit ratings to give their clients a proprietary 
opinion on a bond issue’s credit profile. On the debt origination side, on the other hand, 
investment banks use shadow credit ratings for estimating the spreads that will be demanded 
by investors when new bonds are issued. In this study, shadow ratings are derived for each 
bond issue in the study sample by using a credit rating grid for global manufacturing 
companies published by Moody’s Investors Service (2010). The grid is a simplified version of 
one of Moody’s own credit rating methodologies, and includes factors which Moody’s states 
to be generally most important in assigning ratings to industrial companies. The shadow 
rating model thus provides an intuitive way of measuring an unrated bond issue’s credit risk, 
and is easily comparable to rated bonds. However, as pointed out by Moody’s, the grid does 
not incorporate all rating considerations that Moody’s official credit ratings do. Thus, the 
calculated implied credit rating is not expected to perfectly match the actual rating each 
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company would have. As pointed out previously, shadow ratings are also calculated for a 
sample of rated bonds to assess the accuracy of the calculated grid-indicated ratings.  
Moody’s provides specific credit rating grids for a vast variety of industry types, ranging 
from telecommunications to auto leasing. The global manufacturing grid was chosen here as it 
is the most general of the models, and concentrates on firm-specific quantitative information 
that is available and applicable across most industries. The grid officially also includes a set 
of qualitative variables, but due to limited availability of qualitative data, only quantitative 
variables are included in this study. Although dismissing the qualitative factors admittedly 
makes the rating process less accurate, it also makes the incorporation of a larger sample of 
companies into the research possible. This improves the informational value of the research 
results as a whole. Additionally, it is not uncommon for rating agencies themselves to make 
use of credit scoring models that only concentrate on quantitative data.  
When stripped of its qualitative factors, the global manufacturing rating grid examines a 
company’s credit risk profile on three main dimensions: 1) size and profitability, 2) financial 
policy and 3) financial strength. These factors are further divided into nine sub-factors, which 
are weighted according to their importance, as determined by Moody’s, in producing accurate 
credit risk estimates.
8
 Table 1 depicts all of the rating factors considered as well as their 
individual weightings.  
  
                                                          
8
 The qualitative factors stripped were related to business profile, the sub-categories being product 
diversity and regional diversity. The total weighting of qualitative factors was 20%.   
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Table 1: Grid rating factors 
The table depicts the specific rating factors and their weightings used to calculate implied credit ratings for the 
sample bonds using the shadow rating model. The factors are based on Moody’s grid for the global 
manufacturing industry. The grid contains three key factors (situated on the left side of the table), which are 
divided into nine sub-factors (situated in the middle of the table). The right hand’s side of the table depicts the 
factor weightings. Qualitative business profile factors, which the original grid incorporates, are not included in 
the study. 
 
 
 
All factor estimates for the individual bonds are measured using averages for the past three 
fiscal years prior to bond issuance, except for revenues for which the most recent annual 
figure is used. More detailed information on calculating the rating factors can be found in 
Appendix 1. After measuring the rating factor estimates, the outcomes are mapped to a set of 
numerical values ranging from 1 to 21. The numerical values each represent one of the 
alphanumerical ratings in Moody’s rating category (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca). The 
higher the numerical value of the sub-factor estimate, the lower the implied rating category is 
for that specific factor estimate. Table 2 illustrates the mapping procedure.  
Rating Factor Factor Weighting Relevant Sub-factor Sub-factor Weighting
1.) Size and Profitablility 37,50 % a) Revenues 18,75 %
b) EBITA 12,50 %
c) Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 6,25 %
2.) Financial Policy 18,75 % a) Debt / Book Capital 6,25 %
b) Gross Debt / EBITDA 12,50 %
3.) Financial Strength 43,75 % a) EBITA / Interest Expense 18,75 %
b) Funds from Operations (FFO) / 12,50 %
Gross Debt
c) Funds from Operations (FFO) Less 6,25 %
Dividends / Net Debt
d) Free Cash Flow (FCF) / Gross Debt 6,25 %
Total 100,00 % 100,00 %
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Table 2: Mapping the outcomes of grid sub-categories  
The table illustrates how the potential outcomes for all nine sub-categories used to calculate an implied credit rating for the sample bonds are mapped into a specific rating 
category (first row of table), and then converted into a numerical value to calculate the overall rating score (second row of table).  
 
 
Global Manufacturing Grid
Implied Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca
Score 1 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
Size and profitability Revenues > 24 940 12 470 - 24 940 4 157 - 12 470 1 663 - 4157 831 - 1 663 416 - 831 208 - 416 < 208
EBITA > 2 494 1 870 - 2 494 1 247 - 1 870 831 - 1 247 208 - 831 0 - 208 -83 - 0 < -83
ROAA > 25% 20% - 25% 15% - 20% 10% - 15% 5% - 10% 2% - 5% 0% - 2% < 0%
Financial policy Debt / Book capital < 10% 10% - 20% 20% - 35% 35% - 50% 50% - 60% 60% - 70% 70% - 80% > 80%
Gross debt / EBITDA < 0.5x 0.5x - 1.0x 1.0x - 2.0x 2.0x - 3.0x 3.0x - 4.5x 4.5x - 6.0x 6.0x - 7.5x > 7.5x
Financial strength EBITA / Interest expense > 13x 10x - 13x 7x - 10x 4x - 7x 3x - 4x 2x - 3x 1x - 2x < 1x
FFO / Gross debt > 100% 80% - 100% 50 % - 80% 25% - 50% 15% - 25% 5% - 15% 0% - 5% < 0%
FFO less div / Net debt > 60% 45% - 60% 30% - 45% 20% - 30% 10% - 20% 5% - 10% 0% - 5% < 0%
FCF / Gross debt > 40% 30% - 40% 20% - 30% 10% - 20% 5% - 10% 0% - 5% -5% - 0% < -5%
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The total rating score of the bond is then obtained by adding up each sub-category score 
multiplied by its weight (see weights from Table 1). Lastly, the final implied rating is 
obtained by mapping the total rating score back to an alphanumeric rating based on Table 3.  
Table 3: Mapping the total rating scores 
The table describes how the total rating scores obtained for the bond samples are mapped to an alphanumeric 
rating. 
 
Although consisting of many different measuring and mapping phases, the shadow rating 
process is ultimately quite simple: value-weighted financial ratios are combined to produce a 
credit risk score, which is mapped to an implied credit rating. The deficiency of the model is 
that Moody’s does not provide detailed explanations for how, for example, the factor 
weightings or the individual sub-factors have been chosen. However, the shadow-rating 
model provides an effective way to measure a bond’s credit risk, for practitioners as well as 
for this study, as it provides a simple yet comprehensive risk estimate that is very easily 
comparable to actual credit ratings.  
4.2 Altman’s Z-Score 
Another model for estimating default risk that is widely used by practitioners but also 
highly acknowledged by economic researchers is the so-called Altman’s Z-score model. The 
model was developed by Edward Altman already in 1968, and it has since become 
Grid-Indicated Rating Weighted Total Rating Score
Aaa x < 1.5
Aa1 1.5 ≤ x < 2.5
Aa2 2.5 ≤ x < 3.5
Aa3 3.5 ≤ x < 4.5
A1 4.5 ≤ x < 5.5
A2 5.5 < x ≤ 6.5
A3 6.5 ≤ x < 7.5
Baa1 7.5 ≤ x < 8.5
Baa2 8.5 ≤ x < 9.5
Baa3 9.5 ≤ x < 10.5
Ba1 10.5 ≤ x < 11.5
Ba2 11.5 ≤ x < 12.5
Ba3 12.5. ≤ x < 13.5
B1 13.5 ≤ x < 14.5
B2 14.5 ≤ x < 15.5
B3 15.5 ≤ x < 16.5
Caa1 16.5 ≤ x < 17.5
Caa2 17.5 ≤ x < 18.5
Caa3 18.5 ≤ x < 19.5
Ca x ≥ 19.5
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undoubtedly one of the most recognized methodologies used for default prediction. As briefly 
presented in Section 3.1, the Altman’s Z-Score model can be classified into the category of 
multivariate accounting based default prediction models, where a set of key financial ratios 
are weighted and combined to produce a measure for the probability of default.  
According to Altman (1968), studies conducted already in the 1930’s concluded that firms 
on the verge of default exhibit significantly different financial ratio measurements than 
continuing ones. Altman (1968) argues that these early studies and several other studies of the 
like conducted in later time periods (e.g. the study by Beaver, 1966) imply a definite potential 
of financial ratios as predictors of default, but that adopting the results of the studies is 
questionable due to their univariate research methodologies and excessively high emphasis on 
individual signals of impending problems. Using this as motivation, Altman (1968) develops 
a model where multiple ratios are combined to provide a meaningful predictive model.  
Altman (1968) uses multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) as a statistical technique in 
developing his default prediction model. MDA classifies observations into one of several a 
priori groupings dependent upon the observations’ individual characteristics. The analysis 
technique is often used to make predictions in cases where the dependent variable appears in 
qualitative form (e.g. male or female). The first step in MDA is to establish explicit group 
classifications, after which a linear combination of characteristics that best discriminates 
between the established groups is derived. Altman’s model discriminates between two groups, 
namely default and no default, and, therefore, the analysis is transformed into a simple one-
dimensional form instead of a more complicated multi-dimensional matrix. The discriminant 
function that transforms individual variable values into a single discriminant score (i.e. a Z-
score), which is used to make the classification between default and no default, is as follows: 
Z = v1x1 + v2x2 + ... + vnxn,    (1) 
where v1, v2, ... vn are the discriminant coefficients and x1, x2, ... xn are the independent 
variable values. The discriminant coefficients are computed by Altman through the MDA 
method, while the independent variables are observed characteristic values of companies. 
(Altman, 1968) 
The original sample of the Altman study (1968) consists of 66 manufacturing companies 
with 33 firms in each discriminant group. The defaulted group consists of firms that filed for 
bankruptcy during the period 1946-1965, with asset size ranging from USD 0,7 million to 
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USD 25,9 million. The non-defaulted group consists of corporations with matching asset size 
and other characteristics
9
. As for the financial ratios chosen as variables for Equation (1), 
Altman (1968) chooses 22 different variables for evaluation based on their popularity in 
existing economic literature and their perceived potential relevancy for default prediction. The 
variables can be classified into five ratio categories: liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency 
and activity. From the original list of variables Altman (1968) selects five variables that have 
the best overall predictive power based on the following iterative procedures: 1) observation 
of the statistical significance of various alternative functions, including determination of the 
relative contributions of each independent variable, 2) evaluations of inter-correlations 
between the variables, 3) observation of the predictive accuracy of the various combinations 
and 4) judgment of the analyst. The final discriminant function arrived at is as follows: 
Z = 0,012X1 + 0,014X2 + 0,033X3 + 0,006X4+ 0,999 X5,  (2) 
where 
X1 = Working capital / Total assets, 
X2 = Retained earnings / Total assets, 
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets, 
X4 = Market value of equity / Book value of total debt, 
X5 = Sales / Total assets and 
Z = Overall index. 
Altman (1968) attempts so generalize the results of the study so that the default prediction 
model can be used in a more simplified manner, and concludes that all corporations yielding a 
Z-score of greater than 2,99 clearly fall into the non-bankrupt category, whereas corporations 
that have a Z-score of less than 1,81 are all in the bankrupt category. Altman (1968) refers to 
the area between 1,81 and 2,99 as the “zone of ignorance” or “grey area” because of the 
susceptibility to error classification. Following Hillegeist et al. (2004), the Z-score is in this 
thesis further transformed into a more accurate default probability measure through a logistic 
                                                          
9 Due to large heterogeneity in the defaulted group, careful selection was attempted when forming the 
non-defaulted group. The latter consists of a paired sample of firms stratified by industry and size, 
asset size restricted to USD 1 – USD 23 million. All of these firms were still existent in 1966. 
(Altman, 1968) 
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transformation
10
. In more detail, the logistic cumulative distribution function is used so that 
the probability of default can be calculated as follows:  
Probability of default = e
Z-score 
/ (1 + e
Z-score
)  (3) 
As with the shadow-rating model, Altman’s Z-scores are calculated for each sample bond. 
Again following Hillegeist et al. (2004), year-end financial data from the year prior to 
issuance is used for the calculations. The Z-score is converted into a default probability 
measure using Equation (3), and the probability measure is further mapped to an implied 
credit rating class using the cumulative historical default probability distribution provided by 
Moody’s (see Appendix 2). 
4.2.1 Applications and criticism regarding Altman’s Z-score 
A study by Grice and Ingram (2001) states that Altman’s Z-score has been widely used by 
economic researchers to evaluate the financial conditions of firms in a variety of industries 
and time periods. In addition, the authors state that the model has also been applied by 
practitioners in a variety of business situations involving the prediction of bankruptcy and 
other financial stress conditions. For example, the Grice and Ingram (2001) specify that 
commercial banks often use the model as part of their periodic loan review processes, and 
investment bankers use the model in security and portfolio analysis. Also Brealey et al. (2006) 
comment that refined versions of Altman’s Z-score are regularly used by banks and finance 
companies in default estimations. As the model and its variants are in fact so widely 
acknowledged and used in practice, its inclusion for default probability measurement in this 
study seems viable as well.  
Altman’s Z-score is in many ways similar to the shadow credit rating model presented in 
Section 3.3.1. As widely utilized and practical models, both combine a set of accounting 
based financial ratios with predetermined weightings to produce a credit score, which can be 
mapped into a default probability measure and further into an implied credit rating class. The 
mapping procedures differ in that the shadow rating model directly produces an implied 
rating, whereas the Altman’s Z-Score measures are first converted into default probabilities 
through the logistic transformation, and then mapped to implied ratings through a historical 
default rate distribution. Although the underlying idea of two models is the same, the factors 
                                                          
10 Hillegeist et al. (2004) state that while the logistic transformation is not strictly correct for the 
original Z-score estimated using MDA, it has been shown that the MDA and logit approaches are 
closely related under normality assumptions, which makes the logistic transformation viable. 
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examined in the models differ from each other quite remarkably. In fact, the models do not 
incorporate any of the same financial ratios in the estimations. This is most likely due to the 
fact that the shadow rating model has been published very recently (in 2010) by a company 
specialized in credit analysis, whereas the Altman’s Z-score model was developed back in 
1968 with a smaller data sample and less advanced techniques. It is reasonable to expect the 
risk factors and factor weightings in the shadow rating model to be more up to date, and thus 
for the shadow rating model to able to produce more accurate default probability estimates 
than the Altman’s Z-score model. As stated earlier, however, Moody’s does not provide 
accurate information on how the factors and their weightings have in fact been determined in 
the shadow rating model. Altman’s Z-score thus also adds to the theoretical validity of the 
shadow rating model by pointing out their many similarities. 
Although a widely acknowledged model, Altman’s Z-score has also been subject to 
criticism. For example, Hillegeist et al. (2004) point out that Altman’s Z-Score may be less 
viable when used in more recent time periods. This is due to the fact that the Altman Z-score 
coefficients were estimated with data from the time period between 1946 and 1965, and there 
may be ample reasons for why the associations between these accounting variables and the 
probability of bankruptcy may have changed since these original sample periods. The same 
question is addressed by Grice and Ingram (2001), who also ask whether the model is useful 
for predicting other financial stress conditions than bankruptcy, and whether the model is 
applicable for non-manufacturing industries as well. The results of the study by Grice and 
Ingram (2001) indicate that the Altman’s Z-score model is in fact useful for predicting 
financial distress conditions other than bankruptcy, but that prediction accuracy is 
significantly lower in other more recent time periods than in that of the Altman (1968) study. 
Additionally, the authors report that better predictive accuracy can be achieved by re-
estimating model coefficients, and that accuracy decreases significantly when non-
manufacturing firms are included in the sample. Hillegeist et al. (2004), however, report 
contradictory results regarding the use of updated coefficients, as they find that using Z-score 
coefficients estimated with more recent data does not improve measuring probability of 
default.  
Another set of criticism towards Altman’s Z-score relates to the problem of a potential 
search bias in the chosen variables. Scott (1980) notes that multidimensional approaches, such 
as that of Altman’s Z-Score, can suffer from statistical overfitting: when searching for the 
best set of default predicting financial variables, researchers are neither guided nor restricted 
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by theory, which means that they face an unlimited number of possible variables. Since many 
of these financial variables are highly correlated, the choices are often made on the basis of 
slight differences in predictive power. Researchers attempt to minimize this problem by 
testing the model on a different set of data, but while such tests are useful, they do not change 
the fact that the model itself is a result of an empirical search. (Scott, 1980)  
Furthermore, models based on accounting data are often criticized for using backward-
looking accounting data to produce forward-looking probability estimates. As Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) point out, financial statements are formulated under the going concern principle, i.e. 
under the assumption that the company will not go bankrupt. Thus, the ability of accounting 
data to accurately and reliably assess the true probability of default will by design be limited. 
Additionally, financial statements often understate asset values relative to their market values, 
causing accounting based leverage measures to be overstated (Hillegeist et al., 2004). 
Overstated leverage measures can be expected to produce excessively high probability 
measures. The Altman’s Z-score model does incorporate one market based metric measuring 
the market value of equity to the book value of debt, but together with the shadow rating 
model still incorporates another common deficiency of accounting based models: their failure 
to incorporate a measure of asset volatility.  In the so-called structural framework, greater 
volatility translates into higher default risk simply because there is a larger chance that a 
company’s asset values will fall below the values of their liabilities (Hamilton et al., 2012). 
This implies that there is a higher probability that a company cannot repay its liabilities, and 
default will occur. Thus, a further model incorporating both market value measures and 
volatility measures is included in the study.  
4.3 Merton DD model 
The third model utilized in this thesis is a variant of the well-known structural default 
prediction model developed by Merton (1974). As introduced briefly in Section 3.1, under the 
structural framework of the original Merton model, default occurs at the maturity of debt in 
the event that the value of the issuer’s assets is less than the face value of its debt. Equity is 
viewed as a call option on the issuer’s assets with a strike price equal to the face value of the 
issuer’s debt. The logic behind this framework is as follows: the limited liability feature of 
equity means that equity holders have the right, but not the obligation, to pay off debt holders 
and take over the remaining assets of the firm. This means that the debt holders essentially 
own the firm until the equity holders pay off the debt in full. Thus, in the simplest case, equity 
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is the same as a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike price equal to the book value of 
the firm’s debt. (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003)  
The original Merton model has been extended in a number of ways, one of the most 
famous and advanced extensions being the Moody’s KMV model (also known as the 
Vasicek-Kealhofer / VK model, or Moody’s Expected Default Frequency / EDF model). As 
an example of its extensions, whereas the classic Merton model only allows for a single class 
of debt and a single class of equity, the Moody’s KMV model is extended to include a more 
detailed specification of liabilities: short-term, long-term and convertible debt, as well as 
preferred and common equity (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). In addition, the Moody’s KMV 
model relaxes the assumption of a company’s assets being normally distributed by using 
proprietary default distribution data to determine the final default probability estimate, which 
makes it a more accurate model for the real world. The partially proprietary nature of the 
Moody’s KMV model has lead researchers to apply a somewhat simplified variant of the 
model in economic literature, which incorporates some but not all of the model’s advanced 
elements
11
. The most important difference between the models is the application of normality 
assumptions. The model applied by researchers is often referred to as the Merton Distance-to-
Default model (the Merton DD model), as the Moody’s KMV model uses the term distance-
to-default (DD) for the number standard deviations a firm is away from defaulting. The 
Merton DD model will also be applied in this thesis. 
Regardless of their methodological differences, all applications of the Merton models are 
premised on the assumption that there is a causal, economically motivated reason for why 
companies default. According to the framework of the Merton models, the two determining 
factors for default are a company’s financial risk and its business risk. The models thus take a 
very similar approach to measuring credit risk as does fundamental, financial statement based 
credit analysis. However, the Merton models distinguish themselves by using market based 
valuations instead of book valuations. Namely, the models measure financial risk (or 
leverage) by the difference between the market value of assets and the book value of 
liabilities, and business risk by asset volatility. As asset values and asset volatilities are not 
directly observable, they are estimated using the market value and volatility of equity. 
(Hamilton et al., 2012)  
                                                          
11 The model is discussed for instance in Duffie and Singleton (2003), and applied by Vassalou and 
Xing (2004), Duffie et al. (2007) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) among others.  
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Following the classic Merton model and the Moody’s KMV model, the Merton DD model 
assumes that the value of a firm’s assets evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion 
of the following form: 
                 ,    (4) 
where VA is the value of the firm’s assets,   is the expected return on VA,    is the 
instantaneous volatility of assets and W is a standard Wiener process. Viewing equity (  ) as 
a call option on the firm’s assets (  ), the model makes use of the Black and Scholes (1973) 
formula for valuing call options: 
                      (  )    
    (  )      (5) 
where X is the strike price of the call option, i.e. the book value of debt at time t with a 
maturity equal to T.  ( ) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. With r 
being the risk free rate,    is given by 
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 )  (   
 
    
 )  
  √ 
    (6) 
and    is given by 
         √ .    (7) 
Equation (5) clearly states that the value of a firm’s equity (VE) is directly connected to 
the value of a firm’s assets (VA), and indirectly to the volatility of a firm’s assets (  ). Unlike 
in a typical option valuation case, in which the value of the underlying asset is known and the 
value of the option is calculated, in the Merton DD model the value of the option (the value of 
a firm’s equity) is observable and one aims to solve the value and volatility of the underlying 
asset (a company’s assets).  
In principle, the volatility of a company’s assets relates to the volatility of its equity 
through Ito’s lemma: 
    (
  
  
) 
   
   
   .    (8) 
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As reported by Bharath and Shumway (2008), in the Black-Scholes model, it can be shown 
that 
   
   
 = N(d1)   , so that under the Merton model’s assumptions, the volatilities of the 
firm and its equity are related by 
    (
  
  
)  (  )   .     (9) 
Thus, by simultaneously solving equations (5) and (9) one can derive the values for VA and 
  . However, Crosbie and Bohn (2003) point out that Equation (8) holds only 
instantaneously, as in practice market leverage moves around too much for the equation to 
provide reasonable results. Thus, the Moody’s KMV and the Merton DD models use a more 
complex iterative procedure to calculate   12. The procedure first uses an initial guess of 
volatility to determine asset value. For example, Vassalou and Xing (2004) use    calculated 
from daily stock returns from the past 12 months as the initial estimate for   
13  Using the 
Black-Scholes formula, VA is then calculated for each trading day for the past 12 months 
using VE as market value of equity of that day. Through this process, daily data of VA is 
obtained. The following step is to calculate the volatility of VA, and this measure is then used 
as input to the next iteration, which determines a new set of VA and hence   . This procedure 
is repeated until the values of    converge. Once the converged value of    is obtained, it is 
used to back out VA through Equation (5).  
Once asset values and asset volatilities have been obtained, the probability of default can 
be estimated using the so-called distance-to-default measure (DD-measure). As stated earlier, 
in the Moody’s KMV model, the distance-to-default is simply the number of standard 
deviations that the firm is away from default. In the Black-Scholes world, this is given by 
    
    
  
  
  (   
  
 
 
)  
  √ 
,    (10) 
where the drift ( ) is computed as the mean of the change in ln(VA). Moody’s KMV relaxes 
normality assumptions and uses proprietary empirical default data to acquire the final default 
                                                          
12 Moody’s KMV model also incorporates Bayesian adjustments in asset volatility calculations with 
respect to the country, industry and size of the firm. (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) 
13 Another option would be to use option-implied volatility measures or CDS implied volatility 
measures. 
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probability from this DD-measure. In the Merton DD model, however, normality is assumed, 
and the probability of default is given by 
           
[
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 )  
  √ 
]
 
 
 
 
.   (11) 
In line with the shadow rating and Altman’s Z-score models, the default probability as 
implied by the Merton DD model is calculated for each sample bond. Following the 
methodology of Vassalou and Xing (2004), the issuer’s stock return data from 12 months 
prior to the bond’s issue date is used to calculate the volatility of equity (  ), which is used 
for the iterative procedure of solving the volatility of assets (  ) and the value of assets (VA). 
A tolerance level of 99 % is used for convergence. In the final probability calculations, the 
bond issuer’s short-term debt and 50 % of its long-term debt from the most recent financial 
statement prior to issuance is used as the book value of debt (X). The forecasting horizon (T) 
is one, and for the risk-free rate (r) in equation (6) I use the issue date’s one-year swap rate. 
With these parameters, the result obtained is a 1-year default probability for each sample 
bond. As with Altman’s Z-score, the final probability measures are mapped to implied credit 
ratings using a cumulative 1-year historical default probability distribution provided by 
Moody’s (see Appendix 2). 
4.3.1 Applications and criticism regarding the Merton DD model 
The Moody’s KMV model has been the industry leading default probability model since 
its introduction in the 1990’s. Moody’s Analytics provides default probability measures for 
over 30 000 entities globally on a daily basis, and provides these probability measures to 
customers through various platforms. Moody’s has a long tradition of validating the model, 
and reports that the model has been performing consistently over different stages of the credit 
cycle, including the financial crisis of 2008 (Hamilton et al., 2012). Although the Moody’s 
KMV model has been widely recognized to provide reliable default measures, the Merton DD 
model is not quite as viable as it is in many ways somewhat more simplified. For example, the 
Merton DD model often only considers two classes of liabilities: short-term debt and common 
stock. The Moody’s KMV model, on the other hand, also considers long-term debt, preferred 
stock and convertible stock. In this study, common stock, short-term debt and 50 % of long-
term debt is used. Furthermore, the Merton DD model does not take cash payouts into 
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consideration, and presumes that default occurs only at debt maturity. The Moody’s KMV 
model in turn takes both coupons and dividends into consideration and presumes that default 
can occur at any time. The Moody’s KMV model also determines the so-called default point 
with empirical data, whereas the Merton DD model often assumes the default point to be the 
book value of total debt.  
Even though the Merton DD model is not as accurate in predicting default as the Moody’s 
KMV model, it is still in many ways more advanced than many accounting based models. For 
example, Hillegeist et al. (2012) report that the Merton DD model succeeds significantly 
better in providing information about default probabilities than does the accounting based 
Altman’s Z-Score model. The study’s conclusion is even robust to various modifications of 
the Z-Score, including updated coefficients and industry effect adjustments. One can expect 
that incorporating market based value measures and volatility considerations into the 
calculations enables a model to better capture valuable changes in fast paced environments. 
Thus, market based models might better reflect the level of perceived credit risk, i.e. credit 
spreads.  
5. Description of data 
The data used in this study consists of a sample of fixed- and floating-rate bonds issued by 
European listed, non-financial companies during the time period ranging from January 2001 
to December 2013. All bonds are euro-denominated, senior-ranking, unsecured bonds with no 
callability, convertibility, sinking fund and/or other optionality characteristics. To enhance the 
homogeneity of the sample even further, bond maturity is restricted between one and ten 
years, and the minimum issue amount is restricted to EUR 50 million.  
Table 4 describes the characteristics of the unrated and rated bond samples used in the 
study in more detail. The final unrated bond sample consists of 237 bonds with an average 
issue size of 240 mEUR (median 160 mEUR) and average maturity of 5,6 years (median 5,0 
years). The rated bond sample used for assessing the accuracy of the calculated implied credit 
ratings is larger and consists of 594 bonds. All bonds in the rated bond sample have an 
assigned credit rating by at least one of the major credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & 
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Poor’s and Fitch) at the time of data collection14, and are those which were assigned to the 
bonds at issuance. The average issue amount of the rated bond sample is 639 mEUR (median 
600 mEUR), which is significantly larger than that of the rated bond sample. This is not 
surprising, as unrated bonds are often issued by smaller companies. The average maturity of 
the rated sample is 6,8 years (median 7,0 years), which is also somewhat longer than that of 
the unrated bond sample. Roughly 80 % of the bonds in both samples were issued during or 
after 2008. All bond and issuer specific financial data used for the credit risk calculations was 
collected from Bloomberg. 
Table 4: Description of bond samples 
The table depicts the characteristics of the unrated and rated bond samples. The rated bond sample is used for 
assessing the accuracy of the credit risk models by which the implied credit ratings are calculated for the unrated 
bond sample. 
  Rated bond sample Unrated bond sample 
Issued prior to 2008 120 53 
Issued during / after 2008 474 184 
Total number of bonds 594 237 
Average issue amount (mEUR) 639 240 
Median issue amount (mEUR) 600 160 
Highest issue amount (mEUR) 3269 1000 
Lowest issue amount (mEUR) 50 50 
Average maturity (years) 6,84 5,62 
Median maturity (years) 7,01 5,01 
 
The unrated bonds’ yield spreads at issuance are compared to the issue date’s average 
yield spread of rated bonds with the same level of credit risk (i.e. credit rating). Issuance 
spreads of unrated bonds are used for the comparison as they are able to depict the credit risk 
investors actually perceive the bond to carry in an intuitive way. Namely, right before a bond 
is issued investors analyze the bond and assess its riskiness and attractiveness in practice. 
They also receive topical marketing material on the issuer and the bond at this time. These 
perceptions of the investors are then directly reflected in the market prices of the bonds when 
they are issued, i.e. in their credit spreads at issuance. The average yield spreads to which the 
issuance spreads of unrated bonds are compared to are calculated using iBoxx indices, which 
are rated bond indices for European non-financial companies provided by Markit. The ideal 
                                                          
14
 Some bonds might have had an assigned credit rating at time of issuance, but which has then later 
on been withdrawn. 
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case would of course be to compare individual unrated bonds’ issuance spreads to the 
issuance spreads of individual rated bonds, instead of using average index spreads, to make 
the credit risk comparisons more accurate. However, comparing individual spreads would in 
practice be next to impossible, as it is extremely unlikely that one could fine a large enough 
sample of rated and unrated bonds with corresponding credit risk profiles, issue dates and 
maturities to make the comparisons viable. Also, using indices is good in that indices report 
the average pricing for a given category of credit risk, meaning that indices even out any 
irregularities present in individual rated bonds due to, for example, bond covenants. For 
investment grade bonds (ratings classes between Aaa and Baa), the iBoxx indices are divided 
by rating class (Aaa, Aa, A and Baa) and maturity (1 - 3, 3 - 5, 5 - 7 and 7 - 10 years) into 16 
different indices. The fact that the indices are as specific as this makes the yield spread 
comparisons increasingly reliable - the indices even out irregularities of individual bonds 
while still keeping the sample quite homogenous. For speculative grade bonds (bonds with 
ratings between BB and D), however, only one index is available, which does not specify 
further differences in rating class or maturity. The fact that there is only one index for 
speculative grade bonds available is most likely due to the fact that there simply are not 
enough speculative grade bonds outstanding for further divisions to be reasonable. The credit 
spreads of speculative grade bonds are subject to large dispersion, which makes the 
speculative grade index somewhat less viable for comparisons. However, it is even more 
unlikely that one could find individual matching speculative grade unrated and rated bonds 
for the yield spread comparisons than it would be to find matching investment grade bonds, 
which supports the use of the speculative grade index in any case.  
As for the yield spread calculations: for the rated bond indices, index asset swap margins 
are directly used when reported for the respective iBoxx index. Otherwise, the yield spread is 
calculated by subtracting the corresponding maturity’s swap rate from the reported index 
yield on matching dates. For all floating rate unrated bonds, yield spreads at issuance are 
directly collected from Bloomberg. For fixed rate unrated bonds, Bloomberg reported yield 
spreads at issuance are used when available, and otherwise are calculated by subtracting the 
issue date’s swap rate of corresponding maturity from the bond’s coupon rate. Using coupon 
rates here leads to insignificant inaccuracy as each sample bond has been issued at or very 
close to its par value. 
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6. Results 
This thesis studies the pricing discrepancies between European rated and unrated bonds. 
The study begins with estimating the credit risk of an unrated bond sample utilizing three 
different credit risk models: the shadow rating model, the Altman’s Z-Score model and the 
Merton DD model. The credit risk measurements are used to map the sample bonds to implied 
credit rating classes. The shadow rating model produces an implied credit rating directly, 
while Altman’s Z-Score and the Merton DD model produce probabilities of default, which are 
mapped to implied ratings using historical default probability distributions by ratings class as 
reported by Moody’s. In order to assess the accuracy of the conducted credit risk assessments 
and implied ratings, the same estimations are performed for a sample of bonds with official 
credit ratings. After mapping the unrated bond issues to a specific credit rating class, I assess 
whether the credit spreads of unrated bonds are comparatively equal to the credit spreads of 
rated bonds with corresponding rating classes and other characteristics. Note that all implied 
ratings are calculated bond-specifically to account for timing related factors affecting credit 
spreads. An issuer company can thus have more than one implied credit rating. This section 
first discusses the results regarding the implied credit ratings obtained as well as the three 
credit risk models’ accuracy in the estimations. Then, the central findings regarding the 
examined credit spread discrepancies are examined.  
6.1 Implied credit ratings 
Out of the total unrated sample of 237 bonds, implied credit ratings are calculated for 179 
unrated bonds using the shadow rating model. For the remaining sample, the calculations 
could not be performed due to insufficient data. The calculated shadow credit ratings range 
from Aa3 to Caa1, which means that no ratings from the best or worst rating classes (Aaa & 
Ca) are scored.
15
 59 % of the calculated shadow ratings are investment grade (Aaa - Baa3) 
and 41 % speculative grade (Ba1 - Ca). By examining the calculated implied ratings for the 
sample of rated bonds, one can conclude that the shadow rating model works well. Implied 
credit ratings are calculated for 534 rated bonds out of the total sample of 594 bonds using the 
shadow rating model, with 75 % of the implied ratings being two or less modifiers away from 
the bond’s actual credit rating (for example, Baa1 is two modifiers away from Baa3). That is, 
the vast majority of rated bonds landed into the correct rating category when ignoring the 
                                                          
15 See Appendix 3 for a more detailed description of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch ratings classes. 
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specific numerical modifiers. Out of these, 18 % of the shadow ratings scored the exact same 
rating as actually assigned to the bond at issuance (14 % out of total sample). In total, as much 
as 85 % of the implied ratings calculated with the shadow rating model predicted correctly 
whether the bond is investment grade or speculative grade. The results presented show that 
the shadow rating model is reliable and unbiased in estimating the credit risk of unrated bonds 
and mapping them into correct rating categories, which also makes the yield spread 
comparisons between unrated and rated bonds with corresponding implied and official credit 
ratings viable using the results of this model.   
Using the Merton DD model, implied credit ratings are calculated for 163 unrated bonds 
out of the total sample of 237 bonds. The distribution of the Merton DD model’s implied 
ratings differs from that of the shadow rating model, especially in the higher rating classes. In 
the Merton DD model, the majority of implied ratings (64 %) scored the highest or second 
highest rating class (Aaa / Aa)
16
, whereas in the shadow rating model only 21 % of the 
implied ratings scored these categories. However, the distributions between investment grade 
ratings and high yield ratings do not differ as remarkably between the two models. In total, 72 
% of the implied ratings calculated with the Merton DD model scored an investment grade 
rating and 28 % a high yield rating, the corresponding distribution in the shadow rating model 
being 59 % and 41 % respectively.  
One can quickly conclude that the Merton DD model’s accuracy in calculating implied 
credit ratings is not as good as that of the shadow rating model. Merton DD implied ratings 
are calculated for 421 rated bonds out of the total sample 594 bonds. Only 32 % of the 
calculated implied ratings were two or less modifiers away from the bonds’ actual rating, out 
of which 18 % scored the exactly correct rating (6 % of total sample). These misspecifications 
can largely be attributed to the characteristics of the historical default rate distribution by 
which the Merton DD default probabilities are mapped to implied ratings. Namely, for all 
rating classes ranging from Aaa to A3, Moody’s reports historical 1-year default probabilities 
to have been very close to zero (see Appendix 2 for details). That is, if the Merton DD model 
yields a 1-year default probability of less than about 1 %, it is difficult to specify whether the 
bond should be rated Aaa, Aa or A. Thus, the accuracy of the implied ratings is better only 
when examining the better half of the rating spectrum (Aaa – A3) as a whole, and not by 
                                                          
16
 Due to the characteristics of the historical default rates used to convert the default probabilities of 
the Merton DD model to ratings, these two best rating classes cannot be separated. See more about the 
historical default rates in Appendix 2. 
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rating class. This is supported by the fact that as much as 78 % of the Merton DD implied 
ratings predicted correctly whether the bond possesses an investment grade or a speculative 
grade rating. It is also possible, however, that the Merton DD model simply does not fit the 
bond sample examined, or would work better in estimating default probabilities for a longer 
time period, for example five years. Although the Merton DD model is not as accurate in 
producing implied ratings as the shadow rating model, it is included in the yield spread 
comparisons. Due to the nature of the calculation method, the Merton DD implied ratings can 
be expected to better capture time-sensitive factors affecting investors’ perceptions on credit 
risk, and thus the level of credit spreads, which are depicted in market data. That is, the 
Merton DD implied ratings in a sense provide a more instantaneous figure on how investors 
view the credit risk of a bond at time of issuance, as Merton DD default probabilities are 
calculated using market variables right up to the time of bond issuance, whereas shadow 
ratings are based on historical financial statement data. Even if this was the case, however, 
one must bear in mind the lower accuracy of the model in predicting implied ratings when 
looking at the yield spread comparisons conducted using the Merton DD implied ratings.  
As for the Altman Z-Score model, it is alarmingly apparent that the model does not 
provide unbiased credit risk estimates. Out of the total unrated sample of 237 unrated bonds, 
Altman Z-Score implied ratings are calculated for 185 bonds. Each of these implied ratings 
land in the speculative grade category, which is highly unrealistic. Furthermore, out of the 
calculated sample more than 70 % were rated Caa or lower, implying that the vast majority of 
these unrated bonds are of very high credit risk. Obviously, it is not likely that this be the case 
in reality. When calculated for the rated bond sample (492 rated bonds out of total sample 
594) only two of the implied ratings scored two or less modifiers away from the bond’s actual 
rating – an extremely low number compared to the other two models. Furthermore, only six 
implied ratings predicted correctly whether the bond was high yield or investment grade, out 
of which only one predicted an investment grade rating. The Altman’s Z-Score model is 
clearly biased to predict excessively high default probabilities, which makes the inclusion of 
the model to the yield spread comparisons unfeasible. The biasedness of the model may be 
due to the fact that the model variables as well as their coefficients were estimated using a 
fairly small sample, and they may well be outdated to fit the sample of this study. Altman’s Z-
Score is thus dropped out of the analysis at this point. 
A more detailed description of the implied rating distributions is depicted in Table 5 and a 
summary of model accuracies is provided in Table 6. 
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Table 5: Detailed distribution of implied credit ratings 
The table depicts a detailed distribution of the implied credit ratings calculated for the sample of unrated bonds using three different credit risk models: the shadow rating 
model, the Merton DD model and the Altman’s Z-Score model. The shadow rating model automatically yields an implied rating class, whereas Merton DD and Altman’s Z-
Score implied ratings are obtained by converting the default probabilities yielded by the models into ratings using historical default rates provided by Moody’s. See Appendix 
3 for the historical default rates.  
 
 
 
 
Implied credit rating Number of bonds % Number of bonds % Number of bonds %
Aaa / Aa 11 6.15 % 104 63.80 % 0 0.00 %
A 26 14.53 % 2 1.23 % 0 0.00 %
Baa 69 38.55 % 12 7.36 % 0 0.00 %
Ba 48 26.82 % 13 7.98 % 8 4.32 %
B 23 12.85 % 12 7.36 % 26 14.05 %
Caa 2 1.12 % 16 9.82 % 136 73.51 %
Ca 0 0.00 % 4 2.45 % 15 8.11 %
Total 179 100.00 % 163 100.00 % 185 100.00 %
Investment grade 106 59.22 % 118 72.39 % 0 0.00 %
High yield 73 40.78 % 45 27.61 % 185 100.00 %
Total 179 100.00 % 163 100.00 % 185 100.00 %
Shadow rating model Merton DD Model Altman Z-Score Model
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Table 6: Accuracy of implied credit ratings 
The table depicts the accuracy of the implied ratings calculated with the three credit risk models for a sample of rated bonds. The first row, “≤ 2 modifiers”, shows how many 
of the implied ratings scored two or less modifiers away from the bond’s actual rating (for example, Baa1 is two modifiers away from Baa3). The second row, “Actual 
rating”, specifies how many implied ratings scored the exactly same rating the bond has been assigned in reality. The third row, “IG / HY”, shows how many of the implied 
ratings correctly predicted whether the bond is investment grade or high yield. The percentages are from the total sample unless specified otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
Implied credit rating Number of bonds % Number of bonds % Number of bonds %
≤ 2 modifiers 398 74.53 % 135 32.07 % 2 0.40 %
Actual rating 73 24 0
     Out of total sample 13.67 % 5.70 % 0.00 %
     Out of ≤ 2 modifiers 18.34 % 17.78 % 0.00 %
IG / HY 456 85.39 % 329 78.15 % 6 1.21 %
Calculation sample 534 421 496
Shadow rating model Merton DD Model Altman Z-Score Model
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6.2 Credit spread discrepancies 
In estimating the pricing relationship between the unrated bonds and the rated bond 
indices, I use simple regression analysis: 
         
               
      
        
 ,  (12) 
where the dependent variable         
  is the credit spread of an unrated bond i at a given 
issue date t, with maturity m and an implied credit rating cr. The explanatory variable 
        
  represents the rated index spread on the corresponding date t, with the corresponding 
maturity m and credit rating cr.     is a liquidity proxy representing the issue size of bond i.  
The index credit spread coefficient (  ) is therefore a simple measure of the relationship 
between the credit spreads of rated bonds and unrated bonds. According to the hypothesis of 
the study, if credit risk is equally well accounted for in the prices of both rated and unrated 
bonds, and other relevant factors affecting credit spreads are either equal or controlled for, 
then theoretically the credit spreads of these two categories should not significantly differ 
from each other. It follows that, according to the hypothesis, the coefficient    should equal 1: 
bonds with an equal degree of credit risk should theoretically have equal credit spreads. 
 
H1: Credit risk is equally well accounted for in the pricing of unrated and rated bonds. Thus, 
the credit spreads between the two bond classes do not differ from each other significantly, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Furthermore, if the hypothesis includes the assumption that credit ratings do not 
independently affect credit spreads, i.e. that the lack of an official credit rating does not in 
itself have an impact on a bond’s credit spread, it follows that the constant term (  ) is also 
expected to be zero. The credit spread of an unrated bond should equal that of a rated bond, if 
credit risk and other factors related to the bond’s spread are accounted for equally, and if 
lacking a credit rating does not independently affect the credit spread of a bond.  
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In the reported regression results, the t-values of the index spread coefficients are adjusted 
according to the hypothesis of    equaling one, and are calculated as follows: 
    
     
 
    (  )
      (13) 
Heteroscedasticity is controlled for in the regression analysis with the White-test, which 
generally looks for evidence on an association between the variance of the disturbance term 
and the regressors. The results imply the regressions to be homoscedastic with the Chi-
squares in principle being quite low.  
Timing related factors affecting credit spreads, such as the prevailing spot rate, slope of 
the yield curve and business climate, are automatically accounted for in the regressions, as the 
yield spreads of unrated bonds are compared to the average spreads of rated bonds on the 
corresponding day. Liquidity is another factor which has been shown to affect credit spreads 
(Chen et al., 2007; Van Landschoot, 2004), and is controlled for separately. The issue size of 
a bond is often assumed to give an indication of its liquidity, and along with many other 
research papers it is also used here as a proxy for bond liquidity (see, e.g., Houweling et al., 
2005). The correlation coefficient of the issue size, IS, is expected to be negative: bonds with 
a larger issue size are generally more liquid and thus have lower yield spreads. Put the other 
way around, bonds with a smaller issue size are less liquid, and thus carry a liquidity 
premium, which increases the bond’s spread.  
As discussed in Section 2.1., also other factors, such as taxes and systematic risk, have 
been suggested to affect credit spreads. These other credit spread determinants could on their 
part lead the coefficient    measuring the relationship between the unrated and rated credit 
spreads to be something different than one. It is reasonable to assume that unrated and rated 
corporate bonds are taxed in an equal manner, but the systematic risk component might 
provide some explanation for possible credit spread differences. For example, if the index 
yield spread coefficient estimate is larger than one, the difference can be interpreted to at least 
partly be a result of greater systematic risk. Alternatively, the constant term (  ) could be lead 
to be something other than zero. Additionally, asset volatility, which is only accounted for by 
the Merton DD model, has been suggested to affect credit spreads. This might lead the 
regression results run separately for the Merton DD implied ratings and the shadow rating 
model implied ratings to differ from each other. Of course, the models differ also in other 
respects, as in how they account for leverage, which in addition to explaining some of the 
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mismatches in the implied rating calculations could explain some of the discrepancies 
between the regression results.  
To test the functioning of the regression model as well as the use of rated bonds indices, 
i.e. the average yield spreads rated bonds, as a comparison point, a regression is run for the 
original rated bond sample against the indices. The results are depicted in Table 7. When run 
for the all rated bonds, the regression model works poorly. The index yield spread coefficient 
is below its hypothesized value of one at the 0,1 % significance level, and the constant 
coefficient is above its hypothesized value of zero at the 0,1 % significance level. The issue 
size of the bonds proxying for liquidity returns a coefficient estimate close to zero, implying 
that liquidity does not seem to account for much variation in credit spreads. However, this 
result can be expected because, as stated previously, investment grade issues are generally 
quite liquid. Thus, one would not expect a liquidity premium to be a strong explanatory factor 
for their yield spreads.  
When performing the regressions separately for investment and speculative grade bonds, 
however, the regression model improves significantly. As depicted in Table 7 below, the 
accuracy of the regression model is very good for investment grade bonds. In line with the 
hypothesis of the thesis, the yield spread coefficient is very close to one and the constant 
coefficient is very close to zero. For speculative grade bonds, however, the model seems to be 
less accurate with both the yield spread coefficient and the constant coefficient being below 
their hypothesized values. This is most likely due to the fact that there is often by default 
more dispersion in the credit spreads of high yield bonds, which is caused simply by their 
more diverse nature, higher level of risk as well as the lower amount of high yield issues 
outstanding. To recall, there is also only one index available for measuring the average yield 
spreads of speculative grade issues, which does not distinguish between bond maturities or 
rating classes within the speculative grade rating spectrum. This is also likely to be a reason 
for the regression model being less accurate for high yield issues. The coefficients cannot be 
attributed to any so-called new issue premia or announcement effects, as these would cause 
bond spreads to be higher – not lower – than average. The use of issuance spreads against 
average yield spreads does thus not seem to distort the results. The differences in the 
regression model’s accuracy are also depicted by the R-squares, i.e. the goodness of fit 
measures, of the regressions. For the investment grade sample, the regression model is able to 
explain as much as 74 % of the yield spreads of the individual rated bonds against the rated 
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Table 7: Regression results for rated bonds 
The table depicts the regression results for the sample of rated bonds against the rated bond indices. The regressions are run separately for all rated bonds, investment grade 
rated bonds and speculative grade rated bonds.
 17
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 ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% levels respectively 
All bonds Investment grade bonds Speculative grade bonds
Rated bonds
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,631 0,021 -17,57*** 0,962 0,039 -0,97 0,784 0,070 -3,09**
Amount issued 0,014 0,006 2,33* 0,007 0,008 0,88 0,027 0,045 0,60
Constant 0,362 0,082 4,41*** -0,089 0,080 -1,11 -0,581 0,447 -1,30
n
R-square
Chi-square
591 507 84
0,530 0,741 0,450
7,62 3,78 7,09
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bond indices. For the speculative grade sample, however, the goodness of fit is much lower, 
only 45 %. The differences in the accuracy of these two regressions also explain why the 
regression run for all rated bonds did not provide the hypothesized results. As for the bond 
liquidity proxies, the sizes of the bond issues again do not seem to account for much variation 
in rated bond yield spreads, which is to be expected. 
As for the yield spread analyses of the unrated bonds, the regressions are performed 
separately using the implied ratings obtained from the shadow rating model and the Merton 
DD model. To recall, the Altman’s Z-Score implied ratings are dismissed from further 
analysis due to the model’s extremely high inaccuracy in credit rating calculations. As 
depicted by Table 8 below, when performed for the whole implied rating spectrum, the 
regression results indicate that the credit spreads of unrated bonds differ significantly from 
those of rated bonds with the index yield spread coefficients being 0,358 for the shadow 
rating model and 0,230 for the Merton DD model, and the constant coefficients being 1,164 
and 1,893 respectively. However, the regression results for the rated bond sample implied 
errors in the regression model when used for the whole rating spectrum, and thus, the results 
of the unrated sample are more difficult to interpret. The yield spread coefficients being below 
one is in line with the rated bond sample, but the effects seem to be much larger for the 
unrated bond sample, as the yield spread coefficients are even further away from their 
hypothesized value. This indicates that the credit spread component as represented by    is 
lower for unrated bonds relative to rated bonds. The constant coefficients for the unrated bond 
sample are, however, much larger than zero, and statistically significant at the 0,1 % level, 
which is inconsistent with the rated bond sample for which also the constant coefficient was 
below one. In contrast with the index yield spread coefficients, the extremely high constants 
suggest that the credit spreads of unrated bonds are by default higher than those of rated 
bonds.  
In line with the rated bond regressions, the coefficients for bond liquidity are very low and 
not of statistical significance (0,015 and -0,048 for the shadow rating and Merton DD models 
respectively). This is somewhat surprising, as liquidity has been shown to be relatively 
significant determinant of yield spreads (e.g. Van Landschoot, 2004), and unrated bond issues 
are generally known to be smaller. What is also interesting about the bond liquidity results is 
that the signs of the coefficients for the two models differ from each other, being negative for 
the Merton DD model but positive for the shadow rating model. This implies that yield 
spreads can either increase or decrease with issue size, which is somewhat counterintuitive. 
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However, getting both negative and positive signs for the coefficient estimate is actually 
consistent with other studies that proxy corporate bond liquidity with issue size, and report 
mixed results (see, e.g., Gehr and Martell, 1992; Mullineaux and Roten, 2002). As issue size 
is only a proxy for liquidity, it might be the case that some large bonds are illiquid while some 
small bonds are liquid. Changing the liquidity proxy to for example the bid-ask spread could 
perhaps provide improvement to the regression model, but for unrated bonds this data is 
rarely available. Also, the inaccuracy apparent in the regression model when used for the 
whole rating spectrum most likely affects the liquidity coefficients as well. 
As said, the regressions performed for the rated bond sample implied inaccuracy in the 
regression model when used for examining the whole rating spectrum, as depicted for 
example by the relatively low measure for goodness of fit (0,53). The R-squares of both 
regressions examining all unrated bonds are also low (0,252 and 0,167 for the shadow rating 
and Merton DD models respectively), which implies that there are differences in credit spread 
dispersion between rating classes - one can expect, for instance, that there is higher dispersion 
in the credit spreads of speculative grade bonds than there is in the credit spreads of 
investment grade bonds. This would provide an explanation for the constant coefficients 
jumping to high levels in the unrated bond regressions, as high constants even out the 
dispersion of speculative grade bonds when all bonds are examined together. However, by 
comparing the R-squares of the rated and unrated bond regression, there also appears to be 
differences between the credit spread dispersion of rated and unrated bonds, as the R-squared 
is relatively much higher for the rated bond sample. Higher dispersion in the spreads of 
unrated bonds is, however, not very surprising as the unrated bond market is smaller, less 
liquid and thus also less transparent. These issues will be discussed later on in section 6.3. 
In order to be able to examine the credit spread discrepancies more accurately, the 
regressions are again run separately for bonds with an investment grade implied rating and for 
bonds with a speculative grade implied rating. The results are depicted in Table 8. As with the 
rated bond sample, goodness of fit improves remarkably for the shadow rating model when 
the bond sample is restricted to investment grade bonds only, but only moderately for the 
shadow rating model’s group of speculative grade bonds. This supports the view that credit 
spread dispersion is in fact lower for bonds in higher rating classes than for bonds in lower 
ones. For the Merton DD model, goodness of fit changes only moderately for both rating 
categories, and actually decreases for the bonds with implied investment grade ratings. This 
suggests that there are misspecifications in the implied rating calculations of the Merton DD 
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model, which is discussed more later on in this section. When compared to the R-squares of 
the rated bond sample, it again seems that, overall, there is somewhat more dispersion in the 
credit spreads of unrated bonds. The coefficients for bond liquidity remain mixed for the 
unrated sample, but are statistically significant for the shadow rating model’s investment 
grade implied bonds. However, the sign of the coefficient is still counterintuitive, suggesting 
that credit spreads increase with bond liquidity. For speculative grade implied bonds, on the 
other hand, the liquidity coefficient has a negative sign implying higher spreads for low 
liquidity. The fact that liquidity does not seem to be a significant determinant of credit spreads 
even for the speculative grade bonds is unexpected. Namely, research has found that liquidity 
alone can explain as much as 22 % of yield variations for speculative grade bonds (Chen et 
al., 2007). As mentioned earlier, it might be the case that the liquidity proxy used in this study 
does not function well in capturing the effects of liquidity of credit spreads.  
Although the results demonstrate there to be significant differences in the yield spreads of 
unrated and rated bonds, the more interesting phenomenon apparent for both models is that 
both the index yield spread coefficients and the constants indicate that unrated bonds with 
investment grade implied ratings carry higher credit spreads with regard to their rated 
counterparts than do speculative grade bonds with regard to theirs. For the shadow rating 
model, the results indicate that unrated bonds with an investment grade implied rating are in 
fact priced at a clear credit spread premium when compared to bonds with official investment 
grade ratings. This is depicted by an index yield spread coefficient that is higher than one 
(1,194) as well as a constant coefficient above zero (0,122). Also, to recall, the coefficient 
estimates for the rated bond sample’s investment grade bonds were 0,962 and -0,089 
respectively. The fact that the index yield spread coefficient is higher than one proposes that 
these unrated bonds are priced to be of higher credit risk than their rated counterparts, and 
also the positive constant suggests an additional compensation demanded for investing in low 
or moderate risk unrated bonds. Unrated bonds with a speculative grade implied rating from 
the shadow rating model, on the other hand, have an index yield coefficient lower than one 
(0,716) and a largely negative constant (-0,720), which implies that they are perceived to be 
of lower credit risk and thus carry a lower credit spread with regard to rated bonds with 
official speculative grade ratings. The coefficients are also lower than the ones obtained from 
the rated bond regression (0,784 and -0,581 respectively), which supports this implication, 
although in part mitigating its significance. As for the Merton DD model, the results are 
different in that even though the index yield spread coefficient is higher for investment grade 
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implied bonds than for speculative grade ones, both index yield coefficients are less than one 
(0,731 and 0,397 for investment and speculative grade implied bonds respectively). Also, in 
contrast with the shadow rating model, the constant coefficients for the Merton DD model’s 
investment and speculative grade bonds are both positive (1,765 and 0,485 respectively). 
However, in line with the shadow rating model, the constant coefficient is higher for the 
investment grade implied issues than for the speculative grade ones, and in fact statistically 
significant at the 0,1 % level. In total, the results for the Merton DD model again indicate that 
investment grade bonds have relatively higher credit spreads than speculative grade implied 
bonds when compared to their rated peers. The results demonstrated above depict that the 
credit spreads of unrated bonds differ from those of rated bonds irrespective of their credit 
quality, implying that there are differences in how investors account for the credit risk of 
unrated versus rated bond issues.   
The credit spreads of shorter maturity bonds have been suggested to be more sensitive to 
short run changes in the issuing company, for example the leverage ratio (Van Landschoot, 
2004), which effectively makes these bonds prone to greater credit spread fluctuations. It is 
thus of interest to study the relationship between the relative spreads of investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds with a more stable sample group. Thus, the regressions are performed 
for a bond sample with maturity restricted between 5 and 10 years. The regression results, 
which are presented in Table 9, are in principal consistent with the results discussed in the 
paragraphs above, although they seem to even out somewhat. For example, the constant 
coefficient of the Merton DD model’s speculative grade implied bonds moves closer to that of 
investment grade implied bonds with the index yield spread coefficients remaining roughly 
the same, implying a smaller difference between investment and speculative grade bonds. For 
both models, however, the index yield spread coefficients as well as the constant coefficients 
are still higher for bonds with investment grade implied ratings than for bonds with 
speculative grade implied ratings, suggesting that investment grade unrated bonds carry 
higher yield spreads relative to their rated peers than are speculative grade unrated bonds 
relative to theirs. The regression results for rated bonds are also reported for comparative 
purposes, although they remain to a high extent the same as when reported for all rated bonds 
with investment grade ratings. helouhleokndkanskljdbaljkbsdjkabdlkjbajksdbkajbdlkasbdkabs
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Table 8: Regression results for unrated bonds 
The table depicts the regression results for all unrated bonds, for unrated bonds with an implied investment grade rating and for bonds with an implied speculative grade 
rating. The regressions are performed separately for the two sets of implied ratings obtained using the shadow rating model and the Merton DD model.  
 
 
 
All bonds Investment grade bonds Speculative grade bonds
Shadow rating 
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,358 0,047 -13,66*** 1,194 0,118 1,63 0,716 0,138 -2,06*
Amount issued 0,015 0,044 0,34 0,079 0,036 2,19* -0,078 0,077 -1,01
Constant 1,164 0,210 5,54*** 0,122 0,202 0,60 -0,720 0,761 -0,95
n
R-square
Chi-square
Merton DD 
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,230 0,041 -18,78*** 0,731 0,246 -1,09 0,397 0,111 -5,43***
Amount issued -0,048 0,054 -0,89 -0,076 0,062 -1,23 0,029 0,089 0,33
Constant 1,893 0,184 10,29*** 1,765 0,215 8,21*** 0,485 0,765 0,63
n
R-square
Chi-square
179 106 73
0,252 0,499 0,288
0,167 0,086 0,234
5,74 2,93 6,38
8,31 2,91 6,53
163 118 45
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Table 9: Regression results for bonds with maturities ranging from 5 to 10 years 
The table depicts the regression results for unrated and rated bonds with maturities ranging from five to ten 
years. The regression results are reported separately for bonds with investment grade implied ratings and for 
bonds with speculative grade implied ratings. The regressions for the unrated bonds are performed separately for 
the two sets of implied ratings obtained using the shadow rating model and the Merton DD model.  
 
 
 
  
Rated bonds
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 1,003 0,046 0,07 0,775 0,120 -1,88
Amount issued 0,012 0,009 1,33 -0,026 0,090 -0,29
Constant -0,121 0,093 -1,30 -0,359 0,529 -0,68
n
R-square
Chi-square
Shadow rating 
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,949 0,123 -0,42 0,571 0,15 -2,86**
Amount issued 0,132 0,043 3,05** -0,043 0,076 -0,57
Constant 0,258 0,218 1,18 -0,236 0,769 -0,31
n
R-square
Chi-square
Merton DD 
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,606 0,324 -1,22 0,244 0,109 -6,97***
Amount issued -0,031 0,082 -0,38 0,049 0,080 0,62
Constant 1,756 0,246 7,17*** 1,090 0,753 1,45
n
R-square
Chi-square
302 84
0,702 0,450
Speculative grade bonds,                  
maturity 5 - 10 years
59
Investment grade bonds,                
maturity 5 - 10 years
101
0,035
3,98
1,21
0,446
84
2,61
3,62 7,09
0,207
4,41
32
0,153
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The phenomenon of unrated bonds with investment grade implied credit ratings having 
relatively higher credit spreads than bonds with speculative grade implied credit ratings 
becomes even more evident and interesting when the index yield spread coefficients are 
examined by rating class. Namely, as Table 10 depicts, the coefficient estimates decline 
steadily by ratings class, which implies that the higher the credit risk of the unrated bond, the 
higher its credit spread discount is relative to its rated counterpart. The declining coefficients 
are evident for both the shadow rating and the Merton DD model, although the Merton model 
is somewhat less consistent when examining the constant coefficients as well. In the shadow 
rating model, also the constant coefficients decline steadily with rating class, whereas in the 
Merton DD model the constant first declines, then increases and finally jumps to a very high 
level. In the shadow rating model, the best rating classes (Aa - A) are priced at a clear 
premium relative to rated bonds with both the index yield spread coefficient and the constant 
being positive. When moving to the speculative grade categories, the index yield spread 
coefficients drop below one and the constant coefficients turn negative. The coefficients are 
lowest for bonds rated B1 - B3. Caa rated bonds were not examined due to an excessively 
small sample size. Figure 1 depicts the decline in the index credit spread coefficients. 
Figure 1 
The figure depicts the index yield spread coefficients by rating class for the shadow rating model and Merton 
DD model.  
 
 
  
1,574 
1,278 
0,751 
0,679 
0,774 
0,492 
0,307 
-0,213 -0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
Aa / A Baa Ba BIn
d
ex
 y
ie
ld
 s
p
re
a
d
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
Shadow rating model Merton DD model
48 
 
Table 10: Regression results unrated bonds by rating class 
The table depicts the regression results for unrated bonds by implied rating class. The regressions are performed 
separately for the two sets of implied ratings obtained using the shadow rating model and the Merton DD model.  
 
 
 
 
Shadow rating model Merton DD model
Aa1 - A3 Aa1 - A3
Independent variable Est. Coef. S.e. t-value Est. Coef. S.e. t-value
Index yield spread 1,574 0,274 2,09* 0,774 0,565 -0,40
Amount issued 0,032 0,055 0,58 -0,080 0,059 -1,37
Constant 0,161 0,300 0,54 1,693 0,250 6,77***
n
R-square
Chi-square
Baa1 - Baa3 Baa1 - Baa3
Independent variable Est. Coef. S.e. t-value Est. Coef. S.e. t-value
Index yield spread 1,278 0,169 1,64 0,492 0,570 -0,89
Amount issued 0,097 0,061 1,58 0,469 0,320 1,46
Constant -0,110 0,305 -0,36 0,885 1,403 0,63
n
R-square
Chi-square
Ba1 - Ba3 Ba1 - Ba3
Independent variable Est. Coef. S.e. t-value Est. Coef. S.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,751 0,154 -1,62 0,307 0,294 -2,36*
Amount issued -0,008 0,084 -0,10 -0,037 0,179 -0,21
Constant -1,356 0,830 -1,63 1,111 1,828 0,61
n
R-square
Chi-square
B1 - B3 B1 - B3
Independent variable Est. Coef. S.e. t-value Est. Coef. S.e. t-value
Index yield spread 0,679 0,247 -1,30 -0,213 0,341 -3,56**
Amount issued -0,104 0,138 -0,76 -0,283 0,278 -1,02
Constant -0,123 1,370 -0,09 5,942 3,247 1,83
n
R-square
Chi-square
0,517 0,04
0,473 0,208
3,16 5,95
48 13
37 106
11,45 1,08
69 12
0,347 0,108
5,12 5,47
23 12
0,311 0,110
3,11 10,31
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Of course, one must bear in mind that the regression model was earlier shown to be less 
accurate for speculative grade bonds. The declining trend also in the investment grade classes 
is, however, a quite interesting phenomenon. In order to verify that the declining yield spread 
coefficients especially in the higher rating classes is not a model misspecification, the same 
regressions are performed for the sample of rated bonds by rating category Aa/A, Baa and Ba. 
B rated bonds were not available in the bond sample. As depicted by the regression results in 
Table 11, the coefficient estimates do not decline in a similar manner for bonds with official 
investment grade credit ratings. For both Aa/A and Baa rated bonds, the yield spread 
coefficient stays very close to its hypothetical value of one and the constant coefficient stays 
very close to zero. For bonds with official speculative grade ratings both coefficients are, 
however, quite in line with the results obtained using the shadow rating model. In fact, both 
the index yield spread coefficient and the constant coefficient are roughly in the middle of the 
values obtained for speculative grade bonds from of the shadow rating model. Again, the 
Merton DD model’s results are less comparable.  
It is noteworthy that the goodness of fit for the Merton DD model’s regressions by rating 
class are extremely low, especially for the best rating classes Aa - A for which R-squared is 
only 0,04. This points to very large dispersion in the examined credit spreads. To recall, the 
Merton DD model’s implied rating calculations are most likely erred at least in the investment 
grade rating classes. As stated in Section 6.1, the misspecifications in the higher rating classes 
are caused by the historical default rate distribution used for mapping the Merton DD default 
probabilities into implied credit ratings, which then also causes inconsistencies in the 
regression analyses. Also, it seems that the Merton DD model is to some extent biased to 
estimate excessively high ratings, as depicted by the large amount of bonds that scored a high 
investment grade rating. As can be recalled from Table 5, 64 % out of the Merton DD 
model’s total sample of unrated bonds scored an Aaa / Aa rating, which is unlikely to reflect 
the true level of the unrated bonds’ credit risk. As a result, also the regression results in these 
rating categories can be expected to be distorted, as depicted by the low measured for 
goodness of fit. Furthermore, the fact that most bonds in the Merton DD model scored the 
highest rating classes makes the sample sizes for the other rating classes significantly smaller, 
again leading to somewhat unreliable regression results. Thus, it is perhaps better to 
concentrate on larger bond / credit rating groupings when examining the Merton DD model’s 
regression results. Most likely a part of the Merton DD implied Aa or Aaa rated bonds are in 
reality worthy of an A or Baa rating.  
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Table 11: Regression results for rated bonds by rating class 
The table depicts the regression results for the sample of rated bonds against the rated bond indices. The regressions are run separately by ratings class.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aa1 - A3 Baa1 - Baa3 Ba1 - Ba3
Rated bonds
Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value Est. Coef. s.e. t-value
Index yield spread 1,002 0,061 0,03 0,974 0,064 -0,41 0,784 0,070 -3,09**
Amount issued 0,019 0,008 2,38* -0,006 0,014 -0,44 0,027 0,045 0,60
Constant -0,106 0,070 -1,51 -0,048 0,155 -0,31 -0,581 0,447 -1,30
n
R-square
Chi-square
0,720 0,690 0,450
4,02 5,11 7,09
207 294 84
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6.3 Implications of credit spread discrepancies 
Regardless of the certain issues regarding the regression analyses, the results clearly 
indicate that pricing discrepancies between unrated and rated bonds prevail. One possible 
explanation for these discrepancies supported by earlier literature is simply that the unrated 
issues lack a public credit rating: if credit ratings independently offer value to investors and 
affect their pricing behavior, the prices of unrated bonds should rationally differ from those of 
rated bonds with otherwise equal characteristics. For example, it has been suggested that the 
reason that companies are willing to pay for credit ratings is that they can incorporate price-
sensitive inside information into them and thus the market prices of their securities, i.e. credit 
spreads, without fully disclosing the information to the public (Kliger and Sarig, 2000). The 
inside information included in credit ratings would make the ratings a valuable pricing tool 
for investors, the lack of which would then lead to wider differences in demanded credit 
spreads. Another quite plausible suggestion for credit ratings providing incremental value to 
investors is the monitoring role provided by credit ratings agencies (Boot et al., 2006). 
Namely, if a company’s credit rating is in threat of deterioration, the credit rating agency can 
place the issuer company on so-called “Credit Watch”. The “Credit-Watch” procedure 
incentivizes the company to take action towards improving its credit quality, which again 
offers value to bond investors and drives down the demanded credit spread. The lack of a 
credit rating and an outside overseer of the company should thus increase the credit spreads 
demanded for investing in unrated issues, which would suggest the credit spreads of unrated 
bonds to be higher than those of rated bonds.  
This theory of unrated bonds having higher credit spreads is, however, only weakly 
supported by the study results. Namely, as can be seen from the different regression analyses, 
the credit spreads of unrated bonds relative to rated bonds are not only different, but seem to 
vary with the level of credit risk. The phenomenon of unrated investment grade bonds 
carrying relatively higher credit spreads than unrated speculative grade bonds, as reported by 
this study, can certainly be called an anomaly, especially since the coefficient estimates 
decline with rating class (although this effect isn’t completely reliable when examining the 
speculative grade classes). The possible additional value component of credit ratings and 
rating agencies can perhaps explain some of the overall discrepancies between the credit 
spreads of unrated and rated bonds, but it fails to provide an explanation for the declining 
yield spread and constant coefficients. One factor which provides support for both the overall 
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credit spread discrepancies and the declining credit spread coefficients is the fact that unrated 
bond issues often automatically fall into the speculative grade category when examined by 
institutional investors. If it were the case that institutional investors would demand higher 
credit spreads for all unrated bonds regardless of their actual credit quality, it would simply 
follow that those unrated bonds that would in reality be of high credit quality would be priced 
at higher spreads than advocated by their level of credit risk. This would support the declining 
yield spread and constant coefficients of unrated bonds with investment grade implied ratings. 
Namely, the higher the actual credit quality and implied rating of the unrated bond and the 
lower the credit spread of the similar rated bond, the larger the additional spread is that the 
unrated bond must carry.  
Ignoring the fact that unrated bonds often are directly categorized as speculative grade, 
simply the higher opacity in the unrated bond market when compared to the rated bond 
market can cause differences in investors’ pricing behavior in these markets. Unrated bonds 
are often issued by smaller companies, for which there is less information publicly available. 
Furthermore, institutional investors often stipulate that investments in unrated securities is 
restricted or not allowed at all. The smaller amount of information available in the markets 
and the restrictions large investors pose upon themselves effectively make the unrated market 
less transparent and less traded, prohibiting efficient price formation and leading to credit 
spread illogicalities. The restricted presence of institutional investors in the unrated market 
also affects smaller investors. For example, the guidelines that many institutional investors 
have pegged to credit ratings provide common ground when trading securities in the 
secondary markets of rated bonds. As an article by Financial Risk Management News and 
Analysis points out, without a rating that investors can use for comparative purposes, unrated 
bonds become harder to trade on
18
. The lack of a credit rating and the lower amount of 
information available in the unrated market makes it difficult for investors to compare the 
attractiveness of unrated bonds. These factors leave smaller investors more room for error, 
which again causes the spreads of unrated securities to differ from those of rated ones, and 
also explains why the credit spreads of unrated bonds may be subject to higher dispersion 
than the spreads of rated bonds. Supporting the framework of higher opacity in the unrated 
market, Morgan (2002) studies the risk assessments conducted by credit rating agencies for 
securities issued by the opaque bank industry, and for securities issued by other, less-opaque 
                                                          
18
 ”Unrated bonds: Borrowers go at it alone”, Financial Risk Management News and Analysis, 10 
December 2009. 
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industries, such as e.g. the manufacturing and mining industries. The study uses 
disagreements between bond raters as a proxy for the uncertainty and information asymmetry 
associated with increased opaqueness, and reports, not surprisingly, that the risk of more 
opaque companies is harder to assess, making them more subject to rater disagreement. 
Furthermore, Morgan (2002) reports that rater disagreements decrease with issue size, and 
presumes this to be the result of smaller issues being issued by smaller, more opaque firms, 
which is also relatable to the unrated bond market.  
The opacity issue in the unrated bond market supports a hypothetical framework that 
could explain the declining credit spread coefficients in both the implied investment grade 
and speculative grade rating classes, assuming that the phenomenon is also present in the 
speculative grade classes when using a more sophisticated model. The idea of the framework 
is that, if there was very little information available on a company, investors would most 
likely have highly differing estimations on the level of its credit risk. If investors anticipate 
the company to be of high risk, they will demand a higher credit spread, whereas if they 
anticipate a low risk company, the will demand a lower credit spread. The differing 
anticipations would result in a wide range of credit spread demands, causing the final level of 
the credit spread to amount to some kind of a weighted average of the range of demanded 
spreads. If the company was in reality of high credit quality, the average spread demanded 
would most likely force the company to pay a higher premium than required by its level of 
risk. This is consistent with the yield spread coefficients declining for the unrated bonds with 
implied investment grade ratings. If on the other hand the company was actually of low credit 
quality, the average spread demanded by investors would benefit the company, enabling it to 
pay a smaller premium than required by its level of risk. This would again be constant with 
the declining yield spread coefficients for the unrated bonds with speculative grade ratings: 
the lower the actual credit quality, the lower the index yield spread coefficient and the larger 
the benefit of increased opaqueness.  
Although various theories can be built around the interesting phenomenon of declining 
credit spreads, much of the unrated bond market is still dominated by practical factors. The 
presence of institutional investors in the unrated bond market is smaller than in the rated 
market, which decreases the unrated market’s transparency and efficiency, and leaving more 
room for smaller investors to make errors. Unrated issuers tend to be small companies often 
prone to a “home bias”. That is, unrated issuers tend to be companies which investors feel 
they know and are in a sense emotionally attached to. This psychological bias leads investors 
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to be less rational and objective when valuing their investments, often overestimating the 
issuers’ financial stability and creditworthiness, leading to “erred” price formations and credit 
spreads. The home bias of these unrated issuers also causes high demand for the bonds and 
credit-linked notes of these companies. Larger demand naturally translates to a higher price 
and thus a lower credit spread, in this case seemingly in an excessive amount. 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis aims to provide insight into the pricing of European bonds without official 
credit ratings. More specifically, the goal is to study whether credit risk is similarly accounted 
for in the credit spreads of unrated and rated bonds, or whether discrepancies between the two 
classes occur. Utilizing three credit risk measurement models with different theoretical 
underpinnings, I measure the credit risk of a sample of European unrated bonds, and map 
them into implied credit rating categories. The credit risk measurement models used are a 
shadow rating model provided by Moody’s, which is a simplified version of one of Moody’s 
own rating methodologies, the classic Altman’s Z-Score model, which weighs a set of 
financial ratios to provide a standardized credit score, and the Merton DD model, which 
draws its theoretical underpinnings from Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing theory. To 
assess the biasedness of the three models, the implied ratings are also calculated for a sample 
of rated bonds. On the basis of the assessment calculations, it is concluded that the shadow 
rating model is unbiased in estimating implied credit ratings, whereas the Merton DD model 
seems to be somewhat biased to estimate excessively high ratings. The Altman’s Z-Score 
model is completely dismissed from further analysis due to extremely high inconsistency in 
rating predictions. After assigning the unrated bonds an implied credit rating based on the 
credit risk estimates of the shadow rating and the Merton DD model, I assess whether their 
credit spreads are comparatively equal to those of rated bonds with similar credit risk profiles 
(i.e. credit ratings) and other characteristics.   
The hypothesis of the study is that if credit risk is accounted for equally in the prices of 
unrated and rated bonds, and other factors affecting credit spreads are taken into account, then 
theoretically the credit spreads of unrated bonds and rated bonds with the same level of credit 
risk should be equal. That is, the correlation coefficient measuring the relationship between 
the yield spreads of the unrated bond and the rated bond benchmark, which have similar credit 
risk profiles, should equal one. Furthermore, the constant coefficient should equal zero. 
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Liquidity, measured as the issue size of the bond, is controlled for separately. The expectation 
is that the correlation coefficient for liquidity is negative: higher liquidity is expected to imply 
a lower credit spread. The empirical results of the study provide support for rejecting the 
hypothesis of credit spreads between unrated bonds and rated bonds being equal. Using the 
implied ratings of both credit risk models, both the yield spread coefficients and the constant 
coefficients differ significantly from their hypothesized values, with the yield spread 
coefficient being much lower than one and the constant being much higher than zero. The 
coefficients for liquidity, on the other hand, are insignificant. The results are obtained when 
examining the whole implied rating spectrum are difficult to interpret, as the yield spread 
coefficients being lower than one indicate that the credit spreads of unrated bonds are lower 
than those of rated bonds with the same level of credit risk, but the extremely high constants 
imply otherwise. The results are plagued by high dispersion of credit spreads in the different 
rating classes, as depicted by fairly low measures of goodness of fit. Also, the regression 
model is shown to work properly only for investment grade issues, due to the nature of the 
high yield bond market. Thus, the study concentrates on examining these rating classes 
separately. 
Although the economic significance of the results diminishes, an interesting phenomenon 
appears when credit spreads are analyzed separately for investment grade and speculative 
grade bonds. For both the shadow rating and the Merton DD models, the yield spread 
coefficients as well as the constants are higher for unrated bonds with investment grade 
implied ratings than for bonds with speculative grade implied ratings. This suggests that 
unrated bonds with higher credit quality, i.e. higher implied ratings, have larger credit spreads 
with regard to their rated counterparts than bonds with lower credit quality do with regard to 
theirs. In other words, the results imply that investors perceive unrated bonds with high credit 
quality to be relatively riskier than unrated bonds with low credit quality, which is quite 
counterintuitive. The phenomenon becomes even more intriguing when examining the yield 
spread coefficients by rating class. Namely, for both credit risk models, the yield spread 
coefficients decline steadily with rating class, implying that the lower the credit quality of the 
unrated bond, the higher the discount on its credit spread is with regard to its rated peers. In 
the shadow rating model, also the constant coefficients decline steadily, and the best rating 
classes (Aa - A) are even priced at a credit spread premium relative to rated bonds with the 
index yield spread coefficient being higher than one and the constant higher than zero. When 
moving to the speculative grade categories, the index yield spread coefficients drop below one 
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and the constant coefficients turn negative. The results provided by the Merton DD model are 
not as consistent, as although the yield spreads decline, the movements of the constant 
coefficient vary.  
The differences in the credit spreads of rated and unrated bonds can be suggested to be the 
result of various factors. For example, earlier literature suggests that credit ratings provide 
informational value for investors in the form of inside information and the supervising role of 
credit rating agencies, thus affecting the way they price credit securities. However, it is with 
high likelihood that the credit spread discrepancies found in this thesis are simply a result of 
practical issues in the unrated bond market. For instance, institutional investors, which drive 
price formation in most if not all financial markets, are less present in the unrated bond 
market due to various restrictions regarding unrated bonds. This reduces the transparency of 
the unrated market and makes it more difficult for smaller investors to follow the rationale of 
sophisticated investors. Without the guiding role of institutional investors and credit ratings 
providing a simple means of comparison in assessing a bond’s attractiveness, there is more 
room for errors and illogicalities in the prices of unrated bonds, resulting in a higher 
dispersion of credit spreads. Furthermore, as unrated bond issuers are generally smaller 
companies, investors often have psychological and emotional biases towards them in the form 
of over optimism regarding the issuer’s financial stability and creditworthiness. Summing up 
these factors, it is not surprising that the credit spreads of rated bonds and unrated bonds 
differ from each other, and it is also reasonable to assume that the effects are the largest for 
the unrated bonds with the highest and lowest credit risk profiles, leading to a declining 
pattern in the coefficient estimates.  
My research focuses solely on a homogeneous sample of unrated and rated bonds to study 
the credit spread discrepancies in the European markets. However, the results of the study 
suggest there to be ample interesting topics for further research in the unrated securities 
markets on the whole. One interesting possibility for further research would be to expand the 
study to account for a wider set of geographical areas. For example, as the bond market is 
both larger and more developed in the US than in Europe, performing a similar study in the 
US bond market could provide more insight into how exactly the prices of unrated bonds 
behave with regard to their rated counterparts, or whether the phenomena even prevail in 
larger bond markets. Another interesting topic would be to expand the research sample to 
include a wider range of unrated securities. For example, studying whether the prices of 
stocks issued by unrated companies behave differently from the stocks of rated companies 
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would reveal whether the same phenomena hold in other market segments as well. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to perform a more accurate study on how the pricing 
discrepancies between unrated and rated securities evolve over time, especially since the 
market for unrated debt securities is constantly becoming larger and gaining influence.   
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Appendix 1 
  
Rating factor 
Factor 
weighting   Sub-factor 
Sub-factor 
weighting 
1.) Size and 37,50 % a.) Revenues 18,75 % 
 
profitability 
 
b.) EBITA 12,50 % 
  
 
c.) Return on average assets 6,25 % 
         EBITA / Average total assets   
2.) Financial 18,75 % a.) Debt / Book capital 6,25 % 
  
policy 
  b.) Gross debt / EBITDA 
12,50 % 
3.) Financial 43,75 % a.) EBITDA / Interest expense 18,75 % 
 strength 
 
b.) FFO / Gross debt 12,50 % 
   
 
 FFO = Cash from operations 
- change in working capital - 
change in non-cash working 
capital 
 
   
c.) FFO less dividends / Net debt 6,25 % 
   
d.) FCF / Gross debt 6,25 % 
        
 FCF = Cash from operations 
- dividends paid - capital 
expenditure 
  
Total 
 
100,00 % 
  
100,00 % 
 
All figures are three year averages except revenues, which is the most recent annual figure. 
All gross debt figures are adjusted according to Moody’s standards: 
Gross debt = short- and long term debt + 0,5 x pension reserves + future minimum operative 
lease obligations. 
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Appendix 2 
Annual Default Study by Moody’s Investors Service 
Average Cumulative Issuer-Weighted Global Default Rates by Alphanumeric Rating,          
1983-2012* 
Rating 1-year default rate 
Aaa 0,000 
Aa1 0,000 
Aa2 0,000 
Aa3 0,052 
A1 0,084 
A2 0,070 
A3 0,062 
Baa1 0,151 
Baa2 0,177 
Baa3 0,273 
Ba1 0,660 
Ba2 0,767 
Ba3 1,754 
B1 2,381 
B2 3,668 
B3 6,372 
Caa1 8,258 
Caa2 17,858 
Caa3 28,029 
Ca_C 41,400 
Investment Grade 0,101 
Speculative Grade 4,721 
All rated 1,858 
  * Data in percent 
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Appendix 3 
Moody's Fitch S&P Rating description (Moody's) 
AAA AAA Aaa 
Investment grade 
Minimal credit risk 
AA+ AA+ Aa1 
Very low credit risk AA AA Aa2 
AA- AA- Aa3 
A+ A+ A1 
Low credit risk A A A2 
A- A- A3 
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 
Moderate credit risk BBB BBB Baa2 
BBB- BBB- Baa3 
BB+ BB+ Ba1 
Speculative 
grade 
Substantial credit risk BB BB Ba2 
BB- BB. Ba3 
B+ B+ B1 
High credit risk B B B2 
B- B- B3 
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 
Very high credit risk CCC CCC Caa2 
CCC- CCC- Caa3 
CC CC Ca 
In or near default, with 
possibility of recovery 
C C   
      
DDD SD C 
In default, with little chance 
of recovery 
DD D   
D       
 
